「華人戴明學院」是戴明哲學的學習共同體 ,致力於淵博型智識系統的研究、推廣和運用。 The purpose of this blog is to advance the ideas and ideals of W. Edwards Deming.

2013年6月16日 星期日

品質眾生相 (9) Chrysler沉淪: 下得了台嗎? (10)日本60年代即進入品質發展成熟初期


J. M. Juran
プロフィール1904年 誕生
1912年 アメリカにいる父親に一家が合流
1920年 ミネソタ大学入学
1924年 シカゴにあるウェスタンエレクトリック社のホーソン工場で働き始める
1926年 ホーソン工場訪問中のベル研究所のチームから検査訓練プログラムの一員に選ばれる
1928年 品質に関する最初の作品となる訓練小冊子「製造上の問題に応用する統計手法」(Statistical Methods Applied to Manufacturing Problems)を作成
1937年 ウェスタンエレクトリックのニューヨーク本社で生産工学関係の長
1941年 レンドリースの局長補佐
1945年 ウェスタンエレクトリック社を去りニューヨーク大学へ
1951年 「品質管理ハンドブック」(Quality Control Handbook)発表
1954年 講演のため日本に招待される
1964年 「現状打破の経営哲学」(Managerial Breakthrough)発表
1979年 ジュラン研究所設立
著書/関連書「現状打破の経営哲学―新時代の管理者像」(Managerial Breakthrough
日本化薬 訳(1969年発行 日科技連出版社)
「品質管理ハンドブック 全3巻(I経営革新のための品質管理、II品質管理のための統計手法、III主要産業における品質管理)」東京レーヨン株式会社 訳(1966年発行 日本科学技術連盟)(Juran's Quality Control Handbook

Lewis W. Diuguid
Chrysler refusal of voluntary recall could turn ugly

By Lewis W. Diuguid

The Kansas City Star
Chrysler is setting itself up for a head-on game of chicken with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

The federal agency asked Chrysler to voluntarily recall Jeep Grand Cherokees from 1993 through 2004 and Jeep Libertys from 2002 through 2007 because of a risk of a fuel tank fire in a rear-end collision. Chrysler refused.
That’s a huge number of vehicles — 2.7 million — and the cost of fixing the problem would be just as big for the automaker, which is majority owned by Italy’s Fiat SpA, The Associated Press reports. The automaker with federal help clawed its way back from the financial brink during the Great Recession.
Making the multimillion-dollar fix could send Chrysler into a financial spiral again. But the danger and liability of those SUVs to their owners and passengers also is massive.
The National Highway Traffic Administration can order a recall and go to court to enforce it. An automaker’s refusal to comply is rare.

Chrysler 'No' To Voluntary Recall Could Be Smart Reputation Strategy

VALLEJO, CA - MAY 02:  The Chrysler and Jeep l...
(Image credit: Getty Images via @daylife)
It seems obviously dumb, at least at face value. The government asked Chrysler to recall 2.7 million Jeeps because their rear-end gas tanks have a tendency to blow up in crashes. The company said no, and is making the case that the Feds reached a faulty conclusion. Automakers rarely defy such requests; rather, communications experts explain that failing to move fast enough on recalls is tantamount to brand and corporate reputation death. The damage to public opinion will be too high.
But the real story is never that simple, any more than it’s reasonable to think that Chrysler’s leadership is so tone-deaf. The unfolding situation is a good excuse to analyze how we understand corporate reputation and, in doing so, perhaps discover that the company is smarter than we think.

Here are three different ways of looking at it:
It’s simply a question of timing. Chrysler announced today that it’s recalling 630,000 Jeeps to fix air bag, seat-belt, and transmission leak problems. Perhaps it fully expects to comply with the government’s request on the gas tanks, but its dealers and suppliers need to sequence the required repairs, so it’s buying them some time.
Its stakeholders reward obstinacy. There are huge, thriving communities of employees, suppliers, and other services providers that do business with Chrysler every day, and thereby value its reputation. Maybe standing up to the government makes Chrysler a more reliable or confident partner to them.
It may have no other choice. I’ve read some reports that there’s no real “fix” for the Jeep gas tanks short of redesigning the vehicles, so Chrysler could be facing an existential problem. Maybe it needs time to finalize plans to buy back all of the vehicles back, or deliver some other immense response.
In each instance, the company would be addressing the needs of stakeholders who will determine the company’s future valuation, and not the demands of public opinion. My guess is that it has done the math and calculated the costs of its decision, as evidenced in risk profiles (likelihood and cost of accidents/day of refusal), disruptions to its supply chain (replacement parts and/or design changes), recall-related marketing expenses (including outright buybacks), and potential impact on end-consumer decision-making (my gut tells me that recalls are common enough that most consumers won’t remember or differentiate this one, unless it’s a lingering problem).
Conversely, it has probably calculated the benefits of taking its bold position, seen in the terms it can give its vendors (or they require of it), the constancy of its cash-flow, a rise in employee productivity or enthusiasm, and other measures that have objective financial consequences.
To glibly pass judgment that Chrysler has made a bad PR move or somehow destroyed its reputation is to misunderstand the way public companies operate and make decisions.
It could still well be the wrong thing to have done, even if the company can point to the right reasons for reaching that conclusion. There’s something called the precautionary principle that says that when there’s no objective consensus on the harmful effects of a policy or act, the burden of proof falls on the entity taking the actions. Living up to this principle can be quite expensive, and Chrysler isn’t living up to it.
But when all the online chatter and Monday-morning expert quarterbacking have subsided — which will be soon, if it’s not already happening — saying no might turn out to be the smartest thing Chrysler could have done.
It may have been its only choice.

Read more here: http://www.kansascity.com/2013/06/05/4274681/chrysler-refusal-of-voluntary.html#storylink=cpy