「華人戴明學院」是戴明哲學的學習共同體 ,致力於淵博型智識系統的研究、推廣和運用。 The purpose of this blog is to advance the ideas and ideals of W. Edwards Deming.

2011年9月17日 星期六

Systemic failure, 《双河灣》引發的一次因緣

systemic, inconsistencies, exemplify, “there they ...

FT社評:“流氓活動”更可怕
Leader_Systemic failure in investment banks
英國《金融時報》 Lex專欄


The timing of UBS's $2bn loss at the hands of a single trader could not have been better for supporters of profound banking reforms such as those proposed by the UK's Vickers review. It could also not have come at a worse time for European banks, again in the grip of uncertainty. We must hope that the former outweighs the latter.


瑞銀(UBS)一名交易員一手造成了20億美元虧損。對於支持徹底改革銀行業(比如英國的維克斯(Vickers)報告提出的那些改革措施)的人士而言,這件事出現的時機再合適不過了。但對於再次陷入動盪局面的歐洲銀行業而言,這件事出現的時機卻再糟糕不過了。我們當然希望,這件事的積極影響超過消極影響。

Whatever else Kweku Adob​​oli, the UBS trader arrested in connection with the loss, has done, he has tilted the politics of banking regulation to the reformers' advantage. The revelations come on the third anniversary of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Everywhere, those who feel that bankers got away with reckless endangerment must be thinking: “there they go again”.


不管因涉嫌造成上述虧損而被捕的瑞銀交易員科維庫•阿多波利(Kweku Adob​​oli)還做了些什麼,他已經讓圍繞銀行業監管的政治鬥爭倒向了對改革者有利的一邊。這件事被曝光,正值雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)破產三週年。在全球各個角落,那些認為銀行家並沒有因其不計後果的危險行為而受到處罰的人肯定在想:“他們又犯老毛病了”。

That is in part true, but only in part. $2bn is an enormous sum of money and losing it is a big scandal for UBS. But the number needs to be seen in context. It barely amounts to four per cent of UBS's $54bn of shareholder's equity. By itself this is not large enough to break the bank – but the knock-on effects on UBS's businesses might be – let alone the financial system. The global economy was wrecked not by supposed individual “rogue traders” but by a systemic and systematic failure to understand the exposures banks were consciously taking on – exemplified by UBS's $50bn losses on mortgage-backed securities just a few years ago.


這種觀點在一定程度上是正確的,但只是一定程度上。 20億美元是一大筆錢,這筆虧損對瑞銀而言是一樁重大醜聞。但我們必須從整體角度看待這個數字。它僅相當於瑞銀540億美元股東權益的4%。就這個數字自身而言,它還沒有大到足以毀滅該行的程度(雖然此事對瑞銀業務造成的連鎖影響可能會拖垮這家銀行),更別提毀滅整個金融體係了。全球經濟之所以遭受重創,罪魁禍首並不是人們口中的一個個“流氓交易員”,而是要歸咎於一點,即人們仍然無法系統地、有條理地理解銀行主動承擔的風險敞口。幾年前,瑞銀在抵押貸款支持證券(MBS)上的500億美元虧損就是一個典型的例子。

Moreover, the “rogue trader” label should be taken with a pinch of salt. It is not yet known what sorts of internal risk management rules at UBS were broken, if any. But that “Delta One” desks such as the one Mr Adob​​oli worked on can cause losses is evident. Placed in a grey area between proprietary and for-client trading, these desks deploy client assets to match certain benchmarks for their customers – tracking the price of gold, for example. Any excess profits generated by providing that exposure can be kept by the bank: a perfect incentive to take on extra risk with the bank's own balance sheet. Whether or not Mr Adob​​oli broke internal rules or external laws, taking such risks insofar as legally possible is what investment banks are set up do . If “rogue traders” are problem, “rogue activity” is a bigger one.


另外,我們應該帶著懷疑的態度看待“流氓交易員”這類指控。目前尚不清楚,這件事違反了瑞銀哪類內部風險管理規定——假如真的違反了的話。但是,阿多波利所在的“Delta One”部門有可能造成虧損,這一點是顯而易見的。該部門的交易介於自營交易和代客交易之間的灰色區域,對客戶資產進行配置以匹配某些基準,比方說追踪金價。通過提供這一風險敞口而獲得的所有額外盈利都可被該行保留:這是對利用銀行自身資產負債表承擔更多風險的絕好激勵。不管阿多波利違反的是內部規定還是外部法律,“只要法律上可行就要去承擔這類風險”正是投行業一直奉行的。如果“流氓交易員”是一個問題的話,那麼“流氓活動”則是一個更大的問題。

So the UBS scandal mainly confirms what we already know. The narrow lesson is that derivati​​ves can conceal risk as well as manage it. The broad lesson is that inherently risky investment banking, must not be allowed to contaminate utility banking or the wider economy. It is a call to speed up efforts to increase investment banks' capital buffers and the ease with which they can be resolved if the buffers are worn through. If this is done, the risks investment banks take on and the gains and losses that ensue are largely a matter between banks and their shareholders – provided that shareholders are not defrauded or misled.


因此,瑞銀這樁醜聞證實了我們已經知道的一些事情。狹義的教訓是,衍生品的確可用來管理風險,但它本身也隱藏著風險。廣義的教訓則是,決不能允許天生高風險的投行業危及公用事業銀行業或更廣泛的經濟。因此,我們有必要加快努力,增加投行的資本金緩衝層,並在這些緩衝耗盡的情況下減小投行的解體難度。如果做到了這些,投行承擔的風險以及隨之帶來的收益和損失,基本上就成為銀行及其股東之間的事情——前提是股東沒有遭到欺騙或誤導。

This, however, is not the situation we are in.,The UBS scandal will have repercussions. Most obviously on UBS itself – with its reputation badly damaged by its subprime losses, this additional blow will make things harder for its private wealth management business. And by bringing home how little we know about the bodies buried in banks' balance sheets, it will fuel scepticism of other banks – especially in the eurozone, where market pressures are intense (even if they lifted a bit after Thursday's joint central bank intervention) .


然而,這並非我們現在所處的形勢。瑞銀這樁醜聞肯定會造成影響。最為明顯的是對瑞銀本身的影響——其聲望曾因次貸損失遭受重創,這次的打擊將令其私人財富管理業務的日子更為艱難。我們認識到,我們對於銀行資產負債表內隱藏的情況知之甚少,這將讓我們對其它銀行產生懷疑,特別是在市場承受強大壓力的歐元區的銀行(儘管在周四全球五大央行聯手干預後,這種壓力減輕了一些)。

The biggest questions raised by the affair are for Switzerland. The country that prides itself on conservatism in dealing with money has been losing patience with the risk-taking culture of investment banks. It may find that even the “Swiss finish” to Basel III capital rules is not enough to protect its public finances against losses.


此事引發的最大問題是針對瑞士的。這個曾以在資金處理方面走保守路線為傲的國家,正在對投行的冒險文化失去耐心。這個國家可能會發現,即便瑞士實行比《巴塞爾協議III》(Basel III)更為嚴格的資本金規定(瑞士終結方案,Swiss finish),也不足以保護其公共金融不受損失。

Cultures are difficult to regulate by edict, but they do evolve when the environment changes. To get investment banking culture under control, a good start would be for everyone to stop subsidising it.


文化很難通過法令來監管,但它們可以隨著環境的變化而變化。要想管控投行文化,大家就要停止對它的補貼——這將是一個良好的開始。



譯者/梁艷裳


《双河灣》引發的一次因緣

今天在聯經架上 看到每本約90元的《双河灣》
這月刊以前都是贈送
約2008年4月 有一則報導某印刷廠的文章
我去詢問 價格很合理
那年暑假 好友 Bill Scherkenbach 在光寶公司當副總經理
我們想法辦講座 出書

台灣戴明圈:2008年東海戴明學者講座 ii (再續前緣)

j
http://demingcircle.blogspot.com/2009/01/2008-ii.html

不過 因為一些技術問題 沒給那家印刷場印 (錯失在我方)
2009年 我們仍要出書 再打電話給代理人 不過 她已離職了

2011年9月15日 星期四

Japan’s tsunami supply chain comeback

這篇沒提到的 更長遠的對於災區的投資 包括設新廠等努力.....


日本供應鏈的活力
Japan’s tsunami supply chain comeback
作者:東京大學教授喬治•奧爾科特, 愛丁堡大學商學院負責人尼克•奧利弗為英國《金融時報》撰稿



After the paralysis of the global supply chain caused by the devastating earthquake and tsunami in Japan in M​​arch, there have been the inevitable calls for a rethink of global, just-in-time supply systems. Some predicted that the disruption would last until the end of the year, if not longer. But just four months on, Japan's recovery is taking place with remarkable speed, in large part because of the unusual brand of co-operative capitalism that underpins the tight-knit and remarkably resilient Japanese business system.


在3月份日本那場毀滅性地震和海嘯導致全球供應鏈陷入癱瘓後,人們不由得發出呼籲:重新思考全球準時制(JIT)供應鏈系統。一些人曾預測,供應鏈中斷的局面將持續到今年年底,甚至更晚。然而,災難發生後僅4個月,日本就以令人矚目的速度開始了復甦。這很大程度上是因為日本獨特的合作資本主義為該國環環相扣、復原能力超強的商業體系提供了支撐。

July's figures revealed that Japan's industrial production had risen for the third month in a row, with auto manufacturers reviving especially strongly. Mitsubishi Electric also announced better than expected first-quarter profits, and has revised upwards its earnings estimates for this year. Other companies have responded strongly too: Hitachi, much of whose domestic production capacity is located in the area most affected, was almost fully operational by the end of March, while Hitachi Port, crippled by the disasters, reopened on April 3.


7月份數據顯示,日本工業產值連續第三個月實現增長,其中汽車製造業的複蘇尤為強勁。三菱電機(Mitsubishi Electric)公佈的第一季度營利數據好於預期,該企業還調高了今年的收益預估。其他企業的表現同樣強勁:日立(Hitachi)在本土的生產線大部分都位於受災最嚴重的地區,但到3月底,就已幾乎全面恢復運營,一度因受災而陷入癱瘓的日立港口也於4月3日重新開放。

Held in awe by many in the west in the 1980s, Japan's system has until recently fallen out of favour for being slow to adjust to changing macroeconomic conditions, resulting in the country's two lost decades. Yet the tsunami has actually revealed the system's capacity for rapid recovery – just as it did following the 1995 Kobe earthquake, and the 2007 Chuetsu earthquake.


上世紀80年代,日本的商業體系令西方國家許多人嘆為觀止,直到近些年,這一體系才漸漸失去了人們的青睞,因為它對不斷變化的宏觀經濟環境反應遲緩,導致日本出現了兩個“失去的十年”。然而,海嘯發生後,這一體系顯示出支持經濟迅速復甦的強大能力,正如1995年神戶地震和2007年新潟(Chuetsu)地震之後的情況一樣。

Many of the current supply problems are due to damage at a plant belonging to electronics group Renesas, in Hitachinaka. The plant, jointly owned by NEC, Hitachi and Mitsubishi Electric, produces a significant share of the world's automotive microcontroller chips. The parent firms have sent hundreds of staff to help with the recovery, but, more interestingly, Renesas's customers are helping out too, with Toyota, Honda and others dispatching staff to help with recovery efforts. At one point, there were nearly 3,000 non-Renesas employees at the plant, mostly engineers. As a result production restarted on June 1, much earlier than first anticipated. By late September production should be back to pre-quake levels.


目前供應方面依然存在的問題中,許多都是因為電子集團瑞薩(Renesas)旗下一家位於常陸那珂(Hitachinaka)的工廠嚴重受損。該工廠的股東還有日本電氣(NEC)、日立和三菱電機,全球相當一部分自動微控芯片都產自這裡。這些母公司派出了數百名員工協助恢復工作的進行,但更有趣的是,瑞薩的客戶們也伸出了援手——豐田(Toyota)、本田(Honda)和其他企業也派出人手來協助。該工廠一度有近3000名非瑞薩員工在幫忙,其中大部分是工程師。因此,工廠6月1日就恢復了生產,比最初的預計提前了許多。到9月底,其生產應該可以恢復地震前水平。

This pattern, in which usually fierce competitors have come quickly to each others' aid, has been repeated elsewhere. Take Hitachi Chemical, which has two factories at Namie, a short distance from the Fukushima nuclear station. One plant produces carbon brushes for heavy- duty electric motors, which are used in vital public infrastructure. Kazuyuki Tanaka, Hitachi Chemical's chief executive, has noted that restarting production was more important than revealing “some important parts of our knowhow to our competitors”. Here, as at Renesas, help has been offered, and accepted, without contracts and without discussion of financial arrangements.


平日里競爭激烈的對手迅速相互施以援手,這種情形在日本其它地方也很普遍。就拿日立化成工業(Hitachi Chemical)來說,它在距離福島第一核電站(Fukushima)不遠處的浪江町(Namie)有兩家工廠,其中一家生產用於重型電動機(用於必不可少的公共基礎設施建設)的碳刷。日立化成工業首席執行官田中一之(Kazuyuki Tanaka)就曾表示,恢復生產比“保護我們的重要技術不被洩露給競爭對手”更重要。這里和瑞薩工廠的情形一樣,在接到其他企業的援助並決定接受的整個過程中,沒有簽訂任何合同,也沒有人討論費用該如何分配。

There has of course been major disruption, despite the speedy recovery. Even a few weeks of lost production is too much for the global clients of major Japanese companies to bear. A range of strategies are therefore being developed to improve resilience, including greater diversification of production and new arrangements to transfer design and production information across manufacturing sites. These will apply to facilities within companies, but also now may include formal agreements with competitors to provide substitute facilities in the event of a future disaster.


儘管恢復速度很快,但生產必然受到了嚴重的阻斷。對於日本各大企業的全球客戶來說,這些企業哪怕停產幾週,造成的損失也讓它們難以承受。因此,人們正構想一系列戰略,以增強復原能力,其中包括提高生產分散程度,並為各個廠址間設計和生產信息的轉移做出一些新的安排。這些新策略將應用於企業內部的各個工廠,但如今也有可能推及至與競爭對手的正式協議——以便在未來發生災難時提供後備工廠。

In spite of this, and especially given the speed at which supply chains have bounced back, there is little sign that Japanese companies are planning to turn their backs on their traditional “just in time” manufacturing strategies, let alone leave Japan entirely. Professor ​​Takahiro Fujimoto of the University of Tokyo, an expert on supply chains and the automotive industry, admits that improving supply chain resilience must be a priority, but believes this can be done without “sacrificing competitiveness”.


儘管如此,尤其是考慮到供應鏈恢復的速度,沒有多少跡象表明日本企業打算拋棄它們傳統的準時制生產戰略,更不用說徹底搬離日本了。供應鍊及汽車製造業專家、東京大學(University of Tokyo)教授藤本隆宏(Takahiro Fujimoto)坦承,改善供應鏈的複原能力應放在重中之重,但他認為,這不需要“犧牲競爭力”就能實現。

The tsunami has graphically demonstrated how co-operative capitalism allows rapid mobilisation of resources and offers a hidden source of resilience to efficient but vulnerable supply chains. It now seems clear that the latest crisis has strengthened, not weakened, Japan's distinctive form of capitalism.


日本海嘯生動地說明了合作資本主義是如何快速調動資源、並為高效但脆弱的供應鏈提供復原力的秘密之源的。現在,有一點看起來很清楚:這場危機是增強而非削弱了日本獨特的資本主義模式。

George Olcott is a professor ​​at the research centre for advanced science and technology at the University of Tokyo. Nick Oliver is head of the University of Edinburgh Business School


喬治•奧爾科特(George Olcott)是東京大學尖端科學技術研究中心教授。尼克•奧利弗(Nick Oliver)是愛丁堡大學商學院(University of Edinburgh Business School)負責人。



譯者/吳蔚

2011年9月10日 星期六

敬悼 趙耀東先生

趙耀東在1972年在東海大學演講中鋼的創業史之清廉愛國 很感動我

其實 胡適之先生在1935年寫的海濱半日談--紀念田中玉將軍

同樣的感人:...."我管軍械採辦的事.....至少替國家省去了逼千萬元的經費" (1924年田先生對胡適和丁文江說)


趙耀東口述歷史
高雄縣文獻委員會出版 350元
鐵頭風雲-- 趙耀東傳奇 劉玉珍著 台北:聯經 1995 250元
(趙耀東出版前看過的傳記 它的缺點是一般台灣傳記的問題: 無注 無索引)




今天2010/4/27 公共電視 說是中鋼1977年開工日

趙耀東



敬悼 趙耀東先生
2008 8 21

經歷
1916民國5年 生於江蘇省淮陰縣
1940 民國29年 武漢大學機械系畢業
1943民國32年 麻省理工學院攻讀機械工程
1950民國39年 擔任中本紡織公司總經理
1951民國40年 籌建台北紡織廠
1968民國57年 擔任中鋼籌備處主任
1971民國60年 擔任中鋼總經理
1978 民國67年 升任中鋼董事長,兼任總經理
1981民國70年 調任經濟部長
1984 民國73年 調任行政院經建會主委
1988 民國77年 轉任國策顧問

2008 8月20日病逝於台灣台北市 我的一次難忘體驗:
* 我很少聽演講。這輩子印象最深刻的演講是:我1970年代初,從高禩謹先生學管理學,他講的,都是很正統的美國企業管理知識。實務方面,高先生會請他的舊部屬來演講,如趙耀東先生(中鋼公司負責人,之後當過經濟部長)的故事最感人....(演講的一些具體內容,可參考雷穎《造化遊戲四十年:雷穎回憶錄》,台北:中央研究院近代史研究所,民國88年(1999),頁175-80。當然,最重要的是親身說法,「趙鐵頭」很有說故事的魅力,讓年青人嚮往。現在,第一代中鋼員工多快退休了……)。高院長又請各行業界領導來演講「台灣的產業問題」,……. * 當年的學生、學長,包括忠樸同寢室的,竟然是"數十年"之後再重逢,大家來去匆匆。趕回美國,趕回台北……



____四大精神是中鋼公司企業文化的基石,但經營理念則是中鋼公司企業文化的具體表現,中鋼公司的經營理念係於七十年 底當時總經理傅次韓先生首次召集一級主管商討管理哲學編輯事宜,到七十三年九月彙集而成的四大經營理念,即增進社會福祉、落實實際績效、發揮群體力量、講 求人性管理。




秉持「取之社會,用之社會」的態度,達成「己利利人,己達達人」的目標,確立企業存在對社會及國家的貢獻。



講求工作效率,提升經營成果,發揮整體績效,達成企業目標。



對內重視協調合作,發揮團隊精神,努力達成目標;對外與下遊業者合作、謀求共同利益,促進我國鋼鐵工業發展。



視員工為企業的寶貴資產,協助其智能提升與成長,獎勵其發揮創意與進取心,尊重其工作尊嚴,重視其應得權益,使能與公司同心,貢獻心力。

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我不相信"代言"

不過這是一種想像

如果馬總統請益 趙耀東、王永慶會說什麼?


作者:高希均 出處:2008年11月號 / 巴菲特 滾錢人生



大 家尊敬的兩位——國營的與民營的——「企業英雄」先後在8月與10月去世,這真是台灣社會的損失。1970年代起,與他們相識,已近40年。「天下文化」 出版了趙耀東的《平凡的勇者》與《台塑打造石化王國——王永慶的管理世界》。所寫兩篇前言的標題就表達了我的評價:「敢想、敢說、敢做」,與「從『大』企 業家到『偉大』企業家——王永慶的企業雄心與事業良心」。


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2008年的秋天正是金融海嘯橫掃全球,台灣景氣受到衝擊,如果馬總統向趙王兩位請益,他們會說什麼?試以第一人稱代擬可能的答覆。


(一)趙氏的答覆

我在經濟部服務的時候,政策目標是「一切為出口」,此刻要變成「一切為成長」。八年來每人所得幾乎沒有提升,「創造」財富遠遠比財富「分配」更重要。因此 我贊成減稅,也贊成對某些關鍵產業(如能源、文化、生化科技)予以扶植。要想盡一切辦法,把GNP的餅(Pie)做大,做大以後,大家就可以分到更多。


政府更要拿出魄力,以最快的速度(包括立法院的挑燈夜戰通過必要的法案),推動幾項重大工程與科技(我曾經向俞國華院長提出由我來推動捷運而未果),如桃園航空城與節約能源科技,讓民眾感受到政府動起來了。


重大政策總是要有魄力的人去做。因此,少打乖乖牌,多啟用一些有膽識的人,有熱情、有抱負;敢做事,敢拚命。



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