「華人戴明學院」是戴明哲學的學習共同體 ,致力於淵博型智識系統的研究、推廣和運用。 The purpose of this blog is to advance the ideas and ideals of W. Edwards Deming.

2012年2月24日 星期五

EU Zone as a system/Tampering

Krugman 教授的這篇評論發人深省
我相信它是 Deming Philosophy 的同路人
日本韓國中國上周搞個峰會 多少了解問題類似

Managing Variability in Thrift Savings Plans
Dr. W. Edwards Deming would refer to this investor behavior as tampering. Tampering is performing an action that makes a stable system worse.

2008我將這篇請教法國戴明協會的會長 請教他對歐盟的看法 他回信如下

Dear Hanching,

The Deming philosophy is not known in EU to a large extent. The best knowledge can be found in France and the UK. About Germany, it's a particular case that I can explain you, because I can speak German fluently and I had many German friends in the past.

The principle of the PDSA cycle has been embedded in German management for a long time, even before Deming and the Japanese stated it. When a company (e.g. Siemens, VW) has an engineering project, they always attempt to make optimum use of their previous experience. They like numerical targets, - a big difference with the Deming way of thinking indeed ! - but they carefully avoid "tampering". In other words, they have a good "sense of variations".

Their national guru of management was Dr. Walter Masing (died), who wrote a big Quality Management Handbook (not translated). Masing was a friend of Deming (and me) but he seemingly thought that his philosophy could not significantly improve the German management philosophy.

Education and training for managers, engineers and supervisors is essential in German management.

This was true 10 years ago. I'm afraid that German companies have been contaminated by bad American management practices now.

Last but not least: the European Commission, executive organ led by Mr. Barroso, is imposing more and more competition all over Europe. When companies cooperate, they are exposed to fines and punishments. Barroso, Brown and Sarkozy believe in the Adam Smith's invisible hand.

Best wishes,


保羅.克魯曼專欄─歐洲正出現一場愚鈍的衝突 2008-12-16中國時報【保羅.克魯曼】  經濟現在面臨數十年來最糟的衰退情勢。儘管已祭出對付經濟低迷慣用的降息措施,仍不管用。想讓經濟止跌,看樣子只能仰賴大規模政府援助。

經濟現在面臨數十年來最糟的衰退情勢。儘管已祭出對付經濟低迷慣用的降息措施,仍不管用。想讓經濟止跌,看樣子只能仰賴大規模政府援助。  不過現在有個問題:那些緊抱過時意識形態的保守派政客,可能(錯誤地)認定他們的選民處在能安渡這場風暴的有利位置,因此擋在路中央不讓別人採取行動。  我說的不是田納西州聯邦參議員鮑伯.寇克,和他的共和黨同僚(彼等對尋求紓困的美國三大汽車廠不假辭色)。我說的是德國總理梅克爾及其經濟官員,當歐洲迫切需要一項救援計畫時,他們卻成了最大的阻礙。  當我們忙於自己的問題時,無暇顧及歐洲經濟的混亂情勢。但與美國GDP相當的歐盟,所遭遇的麻煩並不亞於我們。  歐洲外圍地區的問題最為嚴重,許多經濟小國正經歷拉丁美洲和亞洲過去遭遇的危機:拉脫維亞成了新的阿根廷;烏克蘭彷彿新的印尼。西歐經濟大國:英國、法國、義大利及最大的德國,也受到波及。  和美國一樣,歐洲採用降息來振興經濟,這項貨幣政策很快便達到極限。欲扭轉「大蕭條」以來最嚴重的衰退,唯一的辦法是積極使用財政政策:增加開支或降低稅率以促進需求。現在,人人都知道有必要採取一項大規模、泛歐洲的財政刺激方案。  唯獨德國人例外。梅克爾女士已成了「不女士」(Frau Nein),任何歐洲經濟救援計畫,她都不想參加,她在其所屬政黨的一次會議上說:「我們不參與這種無謂的億萬元競賽。」  梅克爾的財政部長史坦布魯克認為德國不推動振興經濟計畫還不夠,上周更進一步批評其它歐洲國家的計畫,還特別指責英國正在實行「愚鈍的凱恩斯主義」。  德國領導人顯然相信,他們的經濟狀況良好,不需要幫助。他們錯了。真正最糟的,並非他們誤判自己的處境,而是德國高唱反調,阻礙了歐洲共同解決經濟危機的努力。  想想看,假設新澤西州有意透過減稅或公共建設來振興經濟,但這個州級刺激方案並非全國計畫的一部分。很顯然,刺激措施大多會「滲漏」到鄰近各州,最後新澤西州債台高築,許多工作則被其它各州拿走。  歐洲個別國家的處境也很類似。任何一國政府若單方面行動,很可能耗盡大筆外債卻無從創造更多國內就業機會。  然而,歐洲經濟若成為一個整體,這種滲漏就不致構成太大的問題:歐盟成員國的進口平均有三分之二來自其它歐洲國家,如此一來,整個歐洲對進口的仰賴便不致超越美國。這說明歐洲各國採取一項協調一致的刺激方案,會比各國單打獨鬥更有效。  但假如歐洲最大的經濟體不僅拒絕參與,還譏諷鄰國對抗危機所付出的努力,歐洲便不可能有協調一致的行動。  德國大聲嚷嚷說「不」應不致永遠持續。德國權威研究機構Ifo上周警告,德國很快就會面臨自一九四○年代以來最糟的經濟危機。這一情況發生時,梅克爾和她的部長們勢必會重新考慮他們的立場。  不過在歐洲,就像在美國一樣,問題在於時間。世界各國經濟正在快速下沉,而我們正等待某個人,無論他是何人,提供一項有效的政策作為回應。在那個回應最終來到之前,還會造成多少損害?  (克魯曼為美國普林斯頓大學教授,《紐約時報》專欄作家。本報國際新聞組楊明暐摘譯)

Op-Ed Columnist

European Crass Warfare

Published: December 15, 2008

So here’s the situation: the economy is facing its worst slump in decades. The usual response to an economic downturn, cutting interest rates, isn’t working. Large-scale government aid looks like the only way to end the economic nosedive.

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Fred R. Conrad/The New York Times

Paul Krugman


Paul Krugman: European Macro Algebra (December 14, 2008)

Times Topics: European Union

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But there’s a problem: conservative politicians, clinging to an out-of-date ideology — and, perhaps, betting (wrongly) that their constituents are relatively well positioned to ride out the storm — are standing in the way of action.

No, I’m not talking about Bob Corker, the Senator from Nissan — I mean Tennessee — and his fellow Republicans, who torpedoed last week’s attempt to buy some time for the U.S. auto industry. (Why was the plan blocked? An e-mail message circulated among Senate Republicans declared that denying the auto industry a loan was an opportunity for Republicans to “take their first shot against organized labor.”)

I am, instead, talking about Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, and her economic officials, who have become the biggest obstacles to a much-needed European rescue plan.

The European economic mess isn’t getting very much attention here, because we’re understandably focused on our own problems. But the world’s other economic superpower — America and the European Union have roughly the same G.D.P. — is arguably in as much trouble as we are.

The most acute problems are on Europe’s periphery, where many smaller economies are experiencing crises strongly reminiscent of past crises in Latin America and Asia: Latvia is the new Argentina; Ukraine is the new Indonesia. But the pain has also reached the big economies of Western Europe: Britain, France, Italy and, the biggest of all, Germany.

As in the United States, monetary policy — cutting interest rates in an effort to perk up the economy — is rapidly reaching its limit. That leaves, as the only way to avert the worst slump since the Great Depression, the aggressive use of fiscal policy: increasing spending or cutting taxes to boost demand. Right now everyone sees the need for a large, pan-European fiscal stimulus.

Everyone, that is, except the Germans. Mrs. Merkel has become Frau Nein: if there is to be a rescue of the European economy, she wants no part of it, telling a party meeting that “we’re not going to participate in this senseless race for billions.”

Last week Peer Steinbrück, Mrs. Merkel’s finance minister, went even further. Not content with refusing to develop a serious stimulus plan for his own country, he denounced the plans of other European nations. He accused Britain, in particular, of engaging in “crass Keynesianism.”

Germany’s leaders seem to believe that their own economy is in good shape, and in no need of major help. They’re almost certainly wrong about that. The really bad thing, however, isn’t their misjudgment of their own situation; it’s the way Germany’s opposition is preventing a common European approach to the economic crisis.

To understand the problem, think of what would happen if, say, New Jersey were to attempt to boost its economy through tax cuts or public works, without this state-level stimulus being part of a nationwide program. Clearly, much of the stimulus would “leak” away to neighboring states, so that New Jersey would end up with all of the debt while other states got many if not most of the jobs.

Individual European countries are in much the same situation. Any one government acting unilaterally faces the strong possibility that it will run up a lot of debt without creating much domestic employment.

For the European economy as a whole, however, this kind of leakage is much less of a problem: two-thirds of the average European Union member’s imports come from other European nations, so that the continent as a whole is no more import-dependent than the United States. This means that a coordinated stimulus effort, in which each country counts on its neighbors to match its own efforts, would offer much more bang for the euro than individual, uncoordinated efforts.

But you can’t have a coordinated European effort if Europe’s biggest economy not only refuses to go along, but heaps scorn on its neighbors’ attempts to contain the crisis.

Germany’s big Nein won’t last forever. Last week Ifo, a highly respected research institute, warned that Germany will soon be facing its worst economic crisis since the 1940s. If and when this happens, Mrs. Merkel and her ministers will surely reconsider their position.

But in Europe, as in the United States, the issue is time. Across the world, economies are sinking fast, while we wait for someone, anyone, to offer an effective policy response. How much damage will be done before that response finally comes?

2012年2月13日 星期一


半年多前 與南方朔 先生一談 稍微談到他應邀到台大EMBA/孫運璿 介紹

今天他這一篇介紹控訴當今學術界 多少與 Dr. Deming 的想法類似






近年來,西方經濟學術教育界已有「後自閉經濟學」(Post-autistic Economics)這種說法。





二○○二年,美國前芝大經濟系教授黛德莉.麥克隆斯基(Deirdre McCloskey)出了一本小書《經濟學的祕密之罪》,該書可視為「後自閉經濟學」的一個註腳。














2012年2月8日 星期三

Out of the Crisis 1986

Out of the Crisis 幾年前就在Google Book上 應該check 那一處的銷售管道
現在也有 Kindle版本

This product
Out of the Crisis
Out of the Crisis by W. Edwards Deming (Paperback - August 11, 2000)
4.7 out of 5 stars (43)

According to W. Edwards Deming, American companies require nothing less than a transformation of management style and of governmental relations with industry. In Out of theCrisis, originally published in 1986, Deming offers a theory of management based on his 14 Points for Management. Management's failure to plan for the future, he claims, brings about loss of market, which brings about loss of jobs. Management must be judged not only by the quarterly dividend, but by innovative plans to stay in business, protect investment, ensure future dividends, and provide more jobs through improved product and service. In simple direct language, he explains the principles of management transformation and how to apply them.
Table of Contents
About the Author
1. Chain Reaction: Quality, Productivity,Lower Costs, Capture the Market
2. Principles for Transformation of Western Management
3. Diseases and Obstacles
4. When? Mow Long?
5. Questions to Help Managers
6. Quality and the Consumer
7. Quality and Productivity in Service Organizations
8. Some New Principles of Training and Leadership
9. Operational Definitions, Conformance, Performance
10. Standards and Regulations
11. Common Causes and Special Causes of Improvement. Stable System.
12. More Examples of Improvement Downstream
13. Some Disappointments in Great Ideas
14. Two Reports to Management
15. Plan for Minimum Average Total Cost for Test of Incoming Materials and Final Product
16. Organization for Improvement of Quality and Productivity
17. Some Illustrations for Improvement of Living
18. Appendix: Transformation in Japan


Table of Contents
About the Author                                   vii
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xiii
Chain Reaction: Quality, Productivity, Lower 1 (17)
Costs, Capture the Market
Principles for Transformation of Western 18 (79)
Diseases and Obstacles 97 (52)
When? How Long? 149 (7)
Questions to Help Managers 156 (11)
Quality and the Consumer 167 (16)
Quality and Productivity in Service 183 (65)
Some New Principles of Training and Leadership 248 (28)
Operational Definitions, Conformance, 276 (21)
Standards and Regulations 297 (12)
Common Causes and Special Causes of 309 (62)
Improvement. Stable System.
More Examples of Improvement Downstream 371 (17)
Some Disappointments in Great Ideas 388 (9)
Two Reports to Management 397 (10)
Plan for Minimum Average Total Cost for Test 407 (58)
of Incoming Materials and Final Product
Organization for Improvement of Quality and 465 (10)
Some Illustrations for Improvement of Living 475 (11)
Appendix: Transformation in Japan 486 (7)
Index 493

導讀 尊重「人性」與「社會」的經營理論 王友鐘
第一章 改善的連鎖效應
第二章 管理十四要點
第三章 短視近利的惡疾與障礙
第四章 適者生存
第五章 自我大把脈
第六章 機會可一不可再
第七章 又快又好的服務
第八章 擺盪在管制上下限之間
第九章 「五○%的羊毛」?
第十章 雖不中亦不遠矣!
第十一章 令人著迷的變異
第十二章 從原點追蹤
第十三章 隨機中獎
第十四章 兩則個案
第十五章 便宜好用的測試
第十六章 多頭馬車齊步走
第十七章 看看生活點滴
後記 日本為什麼能?
附錄 注釋
議後記 一首值得傳唱的史詩 鍾漢清


Out of the Crisis
W. Edwards Deming
$30.00, 507 pp., 68 illus., August 2003, paperback

"Long-term commitment to new learning and new philosophy is required of any management that seeks transformation. The timid and the fainthearted, and the people that expect quick results, are doomed to disappointment."

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