本文關心故障之分析以及其書寫
影片國家地理NG 書寫為Wikipedia的英文和中文版 (尚可. 不過過份粗略)
美國航空191號班機是美國航空一班從芝加哥奧黑爾國際機場前往洛杉磯國際機場的定期航班。1979年5月25日，執行該飛行任務的一架DC-10-10型客機起飛時因左邊引擎突然脫落而失速墜毀，導致機上271人及地面2人罹難。以機上人員罹難人數計，是次事件至今仍為美國本土史上傷亡最多的空難。以總傷亡人數計，則是九一一恐怖襲擊事件前美國本土傷亡最慘重的空難。
目錄
NTSB調查
American Airlines Flight 191
American Airlines Flight 191 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight from O'Hare International Airport in Chicago to Los Angeles International Airport. On May 25, 1979, the McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 operating the flight crashed moments after takeoff from Chicago. All 258 passengers and 13 crew on board were killed, along with two people on the ground. Until the September 11 attacks, it was the most devastating air disaster in the history of the United States. It remains the deadliest aviation accident to occur on U.S. soil,[note 1] as well as the second most devastating involving a DC-10, after Turkish Airlines Flight 981. It was also the third worst aviation disaster in history at the time, and is currently the tenth worst.
Investigators found that as the jet was beginning its takeoff rotation, engine number one on the left (port) wing separated and flipped over the top of the wing. As the engine separated from the aircraft, it severed hydraulic fluid lines and damaged the left wing, resulting in a retraction of the slats. As the jet attempted to climb, the left wing aerodynamically stalled while the right wing, with its slats still deployed, continued to produce lift. The jetliner subsequently rolled to the left and reached a bank angle of 112 degrees (partially inverted), before crashing in an open field by a trailer park near the end of the runway. The engine separation was attributed to damage to the pylon rigging structure holding the engine to the wing caused by faulty maintenance procedures at American Airlines.
While maintenance issues and not the actual design of the aircraft were ultimately found responsible for the crash, the accident and subsequent grounding of all DC-10s by the Federal Aviation Administration added to an already unfavorable reputation of the DC-10 aircraft in the eyes of the public caused by several other incidents and accidents involving the type. The investigation also revealed other DC-10s with damage caused by the same faulty maintenance procedure. The faulty procedure was banned, and the aircraft type went on to have a long passenger career. It has since found a second career as a cargo airplane.
Investigation
The National Transportation Safety Board was responsible for investigating the accident. The safety board was assigned to determine why the engine separated from the airplane and why the airplane was unable to remain airborne on its two remaining engines.[1]The loss of the engine by itself should not have been enough to cause the accident;[7] Flight 191 should have been capable of returning to the airport using its remaining two engines.[1] Unlike other aircraft designs, however, the DC-10 did not include a separate mechanism to lock the extended leading edge slats in place, relying instead solely on the hydraulic pressure within the system.[1] In response to the accident, slat relief valves were mandated to prevent slat retraction in case of hydraulic line damage.[8]
Wind tunnel and flight simulator tests were conducted to help to understand the trajectory of flight 191 after the engine detached and the left wing slats retracted. Those tests established that the damage to the wing's leading edge and retraction of the slats increased the stall speed of the left wing from 124 knots to 159 knots.[1]
The DC-10 incorporates two warning devices which might have alerted the pilots to the impending stall: the slat disagreement warning light, which should have illuminated after the uncommanded retraction of the slats, and the stick shaker on the captain's control column, which activates close to the stall speed. Both of these warning devices were powered by an electric generator driven by the number one engine. Both systems became inoperative after the loss of that engine.[1] The first officer's control column was not equipped with a stick shaker; the device was offered by McDonnell Douglas as an option for the first officer, but American Airlines chose not to have it installed on its DC-10 fleet. Stick shakers for both pilots became mandatory in response to this accident.[9]
Engine separation
The field service representative from McDonnell Douglas said the company would "not encourage this procedure due to the element of risk" and had so advised American Airlines. McDonnell Douglas, however, "does not have the authority to either approve or disapprove the maintenance procedures of its customers."[1]
The accident investigation also concluded that the design of the pylon and adjacent surfaces made the parts difficult to service and prone to damage by maintenance crews. The NTSB reported that there were two different approaches to the one-step procedure: using an overhead hoist or using a forklift. United Airlines used a hoist; American and Continental Airlines used a forklift. An examination of the DC-10 fleets of the three airlines showed that while United Airlines' hoist approach seemed to work, there were multiple DC-10s at both Continental and American with damage to their pylon mounts.[1]
If the forklift was in the wrong position, as with the procedure used by American, the engine would rock like a see-saw and jam against the pylon attachment points. The forklift operator was guided by hand and voice signals; the positioning had to be perfect or damage could result. The maintenance on the aircraft involved in Flight 191 did not go smoothly. Aircraft mechanics started to disconnect the engine and pylon, but changed shift halfway through. When work continued, the pylon was jammed on the wing and the forklift had to be repositioned.[1]
Examination of the pylon attachment points after the crash revealed damage to the wing's pylon mounting bracket that matched the shape of the pylon's rear attachment fitting. This meant that the pylon attachment fitting had struck the pylon mounting bracket. This was important evidence because the only way the pylon fitting could strike the wing's mounting bracket in the observed manner was if the bolts holding the pylon to the wing were removed and if the engine was being supported by something other than the aircraft. Hence investigators were able to determine that the observed damage to the rear pylon mount existed before the crash, rather than being caused by it.[1]
The damage was not enough to cause an immediate failure; a fatigue crack developed and got worse with each flight. During flight 191's takeoff, the damaged rear pylon mount reached the breaking point and failed. Without this fitting in place the engine, at full takeoff thrust, rotated upward on its still-attached forward pylon mount. The structure surrounding the forward pylon mount then overloaded and failed, and the engine went over the top of the wing and landed on the runway.[1]
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品質眾生相 (22)
On-the-Job Nap Leads to $293M Banking Error
Nodding off at your desk can cost you after all
The clerk “momentarily fell asleep” on the job and accidentally held down the number 2 button on his keyboard for a little too long — think 222,222,222.22 — causing that much money (in Euros) to be transferred out of the bank.
(MORE: Oregon Burglar Falls Asleep While Robbing a House)
While the mistake was eventually noticed and corrected, the on-duty supervisor originally approved the payment request, allowing the funds to go through. On further review of the supervisor’s records, it was discovered that the 48-year-old woman had spent less than 1.4 seconds to examine a total of 603 payments. She was fired for not catching the glaring error — although after bringing her case to court was given her job back — while the snoozing clerk was only handed a slap on the wrist.
So the next time you’re feeling a little drowsy on the job, you might want to take an extra cup of coffee instead of a power nap.
Read more: http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/06/15/on-the-job-nap-leads-to-293m-banking-error/#ixzz2WuH3hZz0
Through
her work as a nurse in the Crimean War, Florence Nightingale was a
pioneer in establishing the importance of sanitation in hospitals. She
meticulously gathered data on relating death tolls in hospitals to
cleanliness, and, because of her novel methods of communicating this
data, she was also a pioneer in applied statistics. We explore the work
of Nightingale, and in particular focus on her use of certain graphs
which, following misreading of her work, are now commonly known as
'coxcombs'.
