「華人戴明學院」是戴明哲學的學習共同體 ,致力於淵博型智識系統的研究、推廣和運用。 The purpose of this blog is to advance the ideas and ideals of W. Edwards Deming.

2010年2月3日 星期三

Toyota's Lost Its Quality Edge? Not So Fast 處理善後

下文感謝Justing 他多年前即指出Toyota大降其成本之負作用

日期: 2010年2月4日上午10:11
主旨: FW: 北美Toyota全力補救處理善後
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豐田汽車公司宣布將發給經銷商維修工具與材料,處理油門踏板可能卡住的問題。這項問題迫使豐田在美國召回230萬輛汽車,數款暢銷車停工,並且可能至少造成10億美元的立即損失,長期損失難以估算。~取材自2010/2/1《紐約時報》

TMS
總裁出面說明,北美Toyota全力補救處理善後

記者/黃逵玉 (U-CAR)

太平洋美東時間21,美國Toyota Motor Sales (TMS) 由總裁兼營運長Jim Lentz親自召開記者會,公開對外說明Toyota對於此次因油門踏板卡阻問題之召回、暫時停售相關車款,與如何處理車輛回廠修繕問題之所有細節。TMS表示經過數次嚴格的測試結果,Toyota已找到適當且有效率的解決方法,隨即進行所有相關車款之修復動作,並盡快歸還召回車輛至顧客手中。

詳細問題發生癥結在於油門踏板機構內部,原先用來增加踩踏阻力之機械結構,其具凹凸耦合狀之特徵,在原有材質變質或是長期使用的影響下,凹凸耦合之表面會因此趨於吻合沾黏,直接造成油門卡阻的問題發生。

面對油門內部結構問題,Toyota選擇最簡捷且有效率的處理方式,便是在油門踏板施力面後方加入一塊鋼製墊片,讓有機會發生卡阻之凹凸耦合面減少面積上的接觸,因而阻斷卡阻之發生。在經過Toyota多次嚴格測試後,認為目前機構上已不具有原先摩擦力過當的傾向。

在經過多次嚴格測試後,Toyota選擇在油門踏板施力面後方加入一塊鋼製墊片,讓有機會發生卡阻之凹凸耦合面減少面積上的接觸,因而阻斷卡阻之發生。

對於修復油門踏板所需之零件備料,TMS已運送至全球各地經銷商,同時技工修復教學訓練亦同步展開,許多經銷商打算以24小時全天無休之修繕計畫,以最快的速度處理相關善後、歸還召回客戶用車。

Jim Lentz
表示,首先對於Toyota所發出的召回消息表示抱歉,對Toyota來說沒有甚麼比客戶的安全與信任重要,接下來TMS能做的便是以最快的速度把事情做出彌補。暫時停產是一個難以下達的抉擇,不過Toyota百分之百相信這是一件對的決策。

Toyota's Lost Its Quality Edge? Not So Fast

A longtime observer of Toyota's factories contends there's little evidence that the company's overall standards are slipping


I have been visiting, studying, and analyzing Toyota for 25 years in Japan, the U.S., Europe, and other countries. I have written six books about Toyota (TM) and many articles, and my students have written PhD dissertations about various aspects of the company. One of my PhD students just successfully defended a thesis on how most of the auto manufacturers, including Toyota, work with their suppliers. His data show Toyota is head and shoulders the best customer to work with on the technical details of designing, prototyping, and testing brakes.

Before all of the recent negative news—about unintended acceleration, recalls of millions of vehicles, and a shutdown of U.S. production—I was working on a book extolling the virtues of this great company, which was using the recession to retain employees, not lay them off, and teach them kaizen (the Japanese philosophy of continuous improvement).

So what happened that is causing the media to write off 60 years of progress in a company that has become a model of operational excellence? It seems to me that the inferences about Toyota's quality problems are emotional and have little to do with actual facts.

Those facts are:

—Carpets that are not clipped down, particularly all-weather rubber carpets sold by dealers, can slide around and jam the gas pedal. This can be a problem in every car—that is why they have clips on the driver's side to hold the carpet in place. If you clip down your carpet, it is perfectly safe. In Toyota's case, there was one documented car crash killing four people, involving a Lexus that a dealer gave out as a loaner car. The dealer threw in an all-weather carpet without fastening it down. It trapped the pedal. The driver got into an accident and the car caught fire. The rubber mat was fused to the pedal, so it was clear what had happened.

Toyota has an extraordinary response to this incident of carpets, including cutting the size of the gas pedal for existing cars and then designing a software fix that will cause pressure on the brake to override the gas pedal and cut off the gas. It is a sophisticated piece of software that is embedded in a computer chip in the engine and has to be programmed differently for different car models and engines. All that is highly time-consuming, and it will take a while to get it into all Toyota cars.

—Sticky pedals. Apparently this is caused by an interaction between the material of one part of the pedal, as made in one plant by CTS (CTS), an automotive supplier, and humidity and wear of a part over time. It is a metal part called a shift lever. CTS uses a different material than Denso, Toyota's other supplier of gas pedals. This is a rare problem in terms of number of problems per one million vehicles but Toyota dealers documented cases of sticky pedals. If you push down the brake firmly, the brake will work fine at slowing down and stopping the car. Apparently pedal wear can also cause problems like this in other cars, but Toyota had a series of reported cases by its customers.

Toyota has a replacement pedal in production at CTS already and has suspended U.S. production of eight models until the new pedals are ready. It still needs to find a fix for the millions of cars out on the road. That fix is expected to be days away, not weeks.

These are the two problems that led to the recall of more than 6 million vehicles and the shutdown of some factories. Is it enough to lead some in the media to suggest there's been a significant change in quality for the whole company? To me that seems like a poor generalization. The design decision on the gas pedal was made five to 10 years ago, working with a supplier, and it passed all of the tests at the time. What does that really have to do with the rest of the company today?

Signs of Strength

I personally have toured Toyota plants and been in their engineering offices in the past year. Unlike many competitors, Toyota had no involuntary layoffs through the recession and had enough extra people during the slowdown to focus intensely on quality and safety. In some plants, 40% of workers who were not needed for production were paid full-time to relearn its famous production system and attack problems in the plant with a vengeance.

In its Georgetown (Ky.) plant alone, Toyota reduced defects found in final inspection by more than 40%, thanks to the ideas of workers on the line. And this plant—which makes the Camry—was already producing some of the best quality in the country. In 2009, 10 of the coveted JD Power initial quality awards for the best vehicles in a segment went to Toyota or its Lexus unit—more than any other automaker.

I come away in awe every time I visit a Toyota facility. It does not do justice to the hundreds of thousands of people in Toyota engineering and manufacturing and the supply base to leap to conclusions based on such thin evidence. Clearly it's no small thing when a company shutters factories that produce its best-selling products. But it seems to me that the inferences about a wider quality problem at Toyota are not based on actual facts.

Liker is Professor of Industrial and Operations Engineering at the University of Michigan.

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