「華人戴明學院」是戴明哲學的學習共同體 ,致力於淵博型智識系統的研究、推廣和運用。 The purpose of this blog is to advance the ideas and ideals of W. Edwards Deming.

2010年2月4日 星期四

Toyota Motor 的質量危機加劇/ 財務預期/召修(第三代)Prius

豐
田汽車公司(Toyota Motor Corp.)的質量危機週二加劇﹐因美國監管機構指責該公司在修復問題油門踏板方面行動遲緩﹐同時揚言要對該公司處以民事罰款﹐並進一步審查豐田產品。

這一出人意料的舉措意味著豐田解決其史上最嚴重安全和公關危機的努力遠未結束。上週﹐美國政府暗示其對於豐田應對油門踏板問題的措施沒有異議﹐油門踏板問題導致豐田召回了約600萬輛汽車﹐並與至少五起車禍死亡事件有關。

Reuters
Jim Lasseter左手和右手分別拿著能正常工作和存在問題的的踏板
美國運輸部長拉胡德(Ray LaHood)週二發表聲明說﹐雖然豐田現在採取了負責任的措施﹐但遺憾的是它費了很大的勁才走到這一步。豐田事件尚未了結﹐我們正繼續審查可能存在的缺陷﹐並監督召回行動的實施。

拉胡德說﹐運輸部官員去年12月飛赴日本﹐提醒豐田管理人員該公司所負的法律責任﹐後來又於1月在運輸部開會﹐堅持讓豐田解決油門踏板問題。

另一名運輸部官員說﹐該部正考慮對這家日本汽車廠商處以民事罰款。生產廠商如果不及時召回問題車輛﹐就違反了《安全法》(Safety Act)﹐可能遭民事罰款﹐最高為每起召回1,640萬美元。

豐田質量總監, Shinichi Sasaki在日本對記者表示﹐美國運輸部的提醒幫助推動我們在此問題上迅速行動起來。他說﹐公司此前一直在考慮是否要採取措施。

Sasaki說﹐我們為什麼突然決定這個時候採取行動?原因是﹐老實說﹐我們擔心如果繼續研究下去﹐我們的可信度將受到質疑。

拉胡德的嚴厲措辭﹐以及透露可能對豐田處以民事罰款﹐彰顯出美國政府對這家日本汽車廠商的政治壓力日增。最近幾天﹐全美汽車工人聯合會(United Auto Workers)已經在華盛頓抗議豐田決定關閉一家由聯合會代表的美國汽車工廠。

週 二﹐兩名國會議員質疑豐田美國總裁蘭茨(Jim Lentz)是否錯誤地表述了召回的修復方案。這兩名議員所在的委員會計劃就豐田事件舉行聽證會。蘭茨週一對媒體說﹐修復方案解決了我們所知的問題。豐田 進行了兩次召回行動﹐一次是為瞭解決油門踏板復位緩慢的問題﹔早些時候的一次召回則是為了進行調整﹐防止地墊卡在油門踏板下導致車輛突然加速。

最 近幾週﹐一些豐田車主報告說﹐沒有裝地墊、也不屬於踏板問題召回車輛之列的汽車也出現了突然加速的事故。來自加州的民主黨籍眾議員韋克斯曼(Henry Waxman)和密歇根州的民主黨眾議員斯圖派克(Bart Stupak)在致豐田的公開信中說﹐豐田的聲明與豐田管理人員1月27日與眾議院能源和商業委員會(Committee on Energy and Commerce)成員會面時的說法不一致。

信中說﹐委員會成員當時問豐田能否確信﹐豐田汽車在車主無意識之下突然加速的問題可以完全歸 於地墊問題和油門踏板卡住﹐當時在場的豐田管理人員回應說﹐車輛突然加速的原因很難確定。此外﹐當時豐田管理人員還暗示﹐駕駛者在車輛速度達到每小時60 英里或以上時油門失控的個案﹐不太可能是由於油門踏板卡住所致。

信中要求蘭茨澄清有關在車輛無意識加速事故中﹐油門踏板卡住扮演了何種角色的說法。豐田說﹐我們收到了此信﹐正在研究。我們一定會配合委員會的質詢。

豐田負責質量問題的副總裁Sasaki在日本的一場新聞發佈會上承認﹐豐田或許未能充分檢驗不同使用條件下汽車部件在車內的整體性能﹐以及這種情況會導致系統出現何種故障。

Kate Linebaugh / Josh Mitchell / Norihiko Shirouzu

****

《日本經濟新聞》5日報導,豐田將召修去年5月上市以來在日本和美國賣出的27萬輛的最新款 (第三代)Prius,修理防鎖死煞車系統 (ABS),豐田則表示問題複雜,還在考慮是否召修該款Prius。

美官方展開調查

太平洋另一端,美國「國家高速公路運輸安全管理局」(NHTSA)已正式對Prius的煞車風波展開調查。針對豐田召修Prius的報導,NHTSA表示 不予置評,任何安全政策都應由豐田宣布,但美國政府自有做法。美國豐田發言人奈特表示,已獲悉NHTSA調查Prius的消息,豐田將充分配合。

對已經宣布兩波總共八款車大規模召修的豐田,NHTSA的調查將構成又一道重大壓力。Prius是豐田由虧轉盈的希望所寄,是全球最暢銷的油電複合動力車,全球綠色汽車的當紅象徵,環保光環羨煞全球車廠。

白宮4日表示,豐田的安全問題,連歐巴馬總統都找官員向他做簡報,起因是聯邦運輸部長3日在國會發生要民眾全面「停開」豐田車的失言風波。

日本最重要的財經報紙《日經新聞》報導,豐田不久就會向日本運輸省和美國聯邦運輸部報告召修新款Prius事宜。日本公共電視NHK則報導,豐田正在考慮這項召修。

日本運輸省官員說,還沒有接到豐田的召修聲明。依照日本法律,豐田在通知運輸省之前,不能自行宣布召修。豐田發言人竹內表示,是否召修,尚無決定。

第三代Prius迄今在日本賣出17萬輛以上,在美國大約賣出10萬3000輛,銷售量幾占整合油電車市場之半。有關該款車輛的煞車問題,美國和日本目前共有大約180件申訴。

「1月後出廠的沒問題」

豐田內部其實知道第三代Prius的煞車問題,因為該公司3日宣布,1月以來出廠 (包括賣到海外)的這款新車ABS系統已重新設計,沒有問題,現在有待決定的,是如何處理1月底以前賣出,已經在路上跑的那些Prius。




******
豐
田汽車公司(Toyota Motor Co.)預計﹐兩起圍繞無意識加速的大規模召回事件將給公司帶來1,000億日圓(約合11億美元)的財務影響﹐並給公司銷售額帶來約700億-800億日圓的損失。

豐田汽車駐日本高級管理人員Takuo Sasaki表示﹐公司已經將此次召回事件的成本均攤到截至2010年3月31日財政年度的第三財季和第四財季中﹐並將這一預期合併到了週四公佈的第三財季財務業績中。

Sasaki表示﹐基於公司對召回事件的影響預計﹐事件會給全球銷量帶來10萬輛的影響﹐其中8萬輛位於北美地區。

他說﹐上述數據只是用於得出財務預期的初步預計﹐還可能發生變化。

2010年2月3日 星期三

Toyota's Lost Its Quality Edge? Not So Fast 處理善後

下文感謝Justing 他多年前即指出Toyota大降其成本之負作用

日期: 2010年2月4日上午10:11
主旨: FW: 北美Toyota全力補救處理善後
收件者:


豐田汽車公司宣布將發給經銷商維修工具與材料,處理油門踏板可能卡住的問題。這項問題迫使豐田在美國召回230萬輛汽車,數款暢銷車停工,並且可能至少造成10億美元的立即損失,長期損失難以估算。~取材自2010/2/1《紐約時報》

TMS
總裁出面說明,北美Toyota全力補救處理善後

記者/黃逵玉 (U-CAR)

太平洋美東時間2月1日,美國Toyota Motor Sales (TMS) 由總裁兼營運長Jim Lentz親自召開記者會,公開對外說明Toyota對於此次因油門踏板卡阻問題之召回、暫時停售相關車款,與如何處理車輛回廠修繕問題之所有細節。TMS表示經過數次嚴格的測試結果,Toyota已找到適當且有效率的解決方法,隨即進行所有相關車款之修復動作,並盡快歸還召回車輛至顧客手中。

詳細問題發生癥結在於油門踏板機構內部,原先用來增加踩踏阻力之機械結構,其具凹凸耦合狀之特徵,在原有材質變質或是長期使用的影響下,凹凸耦合之表面會因此趨於吻合沾黏,直接造成油門卡阻的問題發生。

面對油門內部結構問題,Toyota選擇最簡捷且有效率的處理方式,便是在油門踏板施力面後方加入一塊鋼製墊片,讓有機會發生卡阻之凹凸耦合面減少面積上的接觸,因而阻斷卡阻之發生。在經過Toyota多次嚴格測試後,認為目前機構上已不具有原先摩擦力過當的傾向。

在經過多次嚴格測試後,Toyota選擇在油門踏板施力面後方加入一塊鋼製墊片,讓有機會發生卡阻之凹凸耦合面減少面積上的接觸,因而阻斷卡阻之發生。

對於修復油門踏板所需之零件備料,TMS已運送至全球各地經銷商,同時技工修復教學訓練亦同步展開,許多經銷商打算以24小時全天無休之修繕計畫,以最快的速度處理相關善後、歸還召回客戶用車。

Jim Lentz
表示,首先對於Toyota所發出的召回消息表示抱歉,對Toyota來說沒有甚麼比客戶的安全與信任重要,接下來TMS能做的便是以最快的速度把事情做出彌補。暫時停產是一個難以下達的抉擇,不過Toyota百分之百相信這是一件對的決策。

Toyota's Lost Its Quality Edge? Not So Fast

A longtime observer of Toyota's factories contends there's little evidence that the company's overall standards are slipping


I have been visiting, studying, and analyzing Toyota for 25 years in Japan, the U.S., Europe, and other countries. I have written six books about Toyota (TM) and many articles, and my students have written PhD dissertations about various aspects of the company. One of my PhD students just successfully defended a thesis on how most of the auto manufacturers, including Toyota, work with their suppliers. His data show Toyota is head and shoulders the best customer to work with on the technical details of designing, prototyping, and testing brakes.

Before all of the recent negative news—about unintended acceleration, recalls of millions of vehicles, and a shutdown of U.S. production—I was working on a book extolling the virtues of this great company, which was using the recession to retain employees, not lay them off, and teach them kaizen (the Japanese philosophy of continuous improvement).

So what happened that is causing the media to write off 60 years of progress in a company that has become a model of operational excellence? It seems to me that the inferences about Toyota's quality problems are emotional and have little to do with actual facts.

Those facts are:

—Carpets that are not clipped down, particularly all-weather rubber carpets sold by dealers, can slide around and jam the gas pedal. This can be a problem in every car—that is why they have clips on the driver's side to hold the carpet in place. If you clip down your carpet, it is perfectly safe. In Toyota's case, there was one documented car crash killing four people, involving a Lexus that a dealer gave out as a loaner car. The dealer threw in an all-weather carpet without fastening it down. It trapped the pedal. The driver got into an accident and the car caught fire. The rubber mat was fused to the pedal, so it was clear what had happened.

Toyota has an extraordinary response to this incident of carpets, including cutting the size of the gas pedal for existing cars and then designing a software fix that will cause pressure on the brake to override the gas pedal and cut off the gas. It is a sophisticated piece of software that is embedded in a computer chip in the engine and has to be programmed differently for different car models and engines. All that is highly time-consuming, and it will take a while to get it into all Toyota cars.

—Sticky pedals. Apparently this is caused by an interaction between the material of one part of the pedal, as made in one plant by CTS (CTS), an automotive supplier, and humidity and wear of a part over time. It is a metal part called a shift lever. CTS uses a different material than Denso, Toyota's other supplier of gas pedals. This is a rare problem in terms of number of problems per one million vehicles but Toyota dealers documented cases of sticky pedals. If you push down the brake firmly, the brake will work fine at slowing down and stopping the car. Apparently pedal wear can also cause problems like this in other cars, but Toyota had a series of reported cases by its customers.

Toyota has a replacement pedal in production at CTS already and has suspended U.S. production of eight models until the new pedals are ready. It still needs to find a fix for the millions of cars out on the road. That fix is expected to be days away, not weeks.

These are the two problems that led to the recall of more than 6 million vehicles and the shutdown of some factories. Is it enough to lead some in the media to suggest there's been a significant change in quality for the whole company? To me that seems like a poor generalization. The design decision on the gas pedal was made five to 10 years ago, working with a supplier, and it passed all of the tests at the time. What does that really have to do with the rest of the company today?

Signs of Strength

I personally have toured Toyota plants and been in their engineering offices in the past year. Unlike many competitors, Toyota had no involuntary layoffs through the recession and had enough extra people during the slowdown to focus intensely on quality and safety. In some plants, 40% of workers who were not needed for production were paid full-time to relearn its famous production system and attack problems in the plant with a vengeance.

In its Georgetown (Ky.) plant alone, Toyota reduced defects found in final inspection by more than 40%, thanks to the ideas of workers on the line. And this plant—which makes the Camry—was already producing some of the best quality in the country. In 2009, 10 of the coveted JD Power initial quality awards for the best vehicles in a segment went to Toyota or its Lexus unit—more than any other automaker.

I come away in awe every time I visit a Toyota facility. It does not do justice to the hundreds of thousands of people in Toyota engineering and manufacturing and the supply base to leap to conclusions based on such thin evidence. Clearly it's no small thing when a company shutters factories that produce its best-selling products. But it seems to me that the inferences about a wider quality problem at Toyota are not based on actual facts.

Liker is Professor of Industrial and Operations Engineering at the University of Michigan.

Toyota’s Slow Awakening to a Deadly Problem

Toyota’s Slow Awakening to a Deadly Problem


Published: January 31, 2010

DETROIT — The 911 call came at 6:35 p.m. on Aug. 28 from a car that was speeding out of control on Highway 125 near San Diego.

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Gomez Law Firm

The wreckage of a Lexus ES 350 in which four people died in August after it accelerated out of control.

Related

Toyota to Issue a Fix for Recalled Cars (January 31, 2010)

Times Topics: Toyota Motor Corporation

Jordan Ziprin of Phoenix said regulators had focused exclusively on mechanical issues. “I believe this is an electronic issue.”

John H. Gomez/Gomez Law Firm

Rescuers surrounding a 2008 Toyota Avalon that crashed into a pond on Dec. 26 in Southlake, Tex., killing four people.

The caller, a male voice, was panic-stricken: “We’re in a Lexus ... we’re going north on 125 and our accelerator is stuck ... we’re in trouble ... there’s no brakes ... we’re approaching the intersection ... hold on ... hold on and pray ... pray ...”

The call ended with the sound of a crash.

The Lexus ES 350 sedan, made by Toyota, had hit a sport utility vehicle, careened through a fence, rolled over and burst into flames. All four people inside were killed: the driver, Mark Saylor, an off-duty California Highway Patrol officer, and his wife, daughter and brother-in-law.

It was the tragedy that forced Toyota, which had received more than 2,000 complaints of unintended acceleration, to step up its own inquiry, after going through multiple government investigations since 2002.

Yet only last week did the company finally appear to come to terms with the scope of the problem — after expanding a series of recalls to cover millions of vehicles around the world, incalculable damage to its once-stellar reputation for quality and calls for Congressional hearings.

With prodding from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Toyota halted production and sales of eight models, including its top-selling Camry sedan.

And late last week, the government allowed the company to go ahead to try yet another new fix for its vehicles, which it is expected to announce on Monday.

At almost every step that led to its current predicament, Toyota underestimated the severity of the sudden-acceleration problem affecting its most popular cars. It went from discounting early reports of problems to overconfidently announcing diagnoses and insufficient fixes.

As recently as the fall, Toyota was still saying it was confident that loose floor mats were the sole cause of any sudden acceleration, issuing an advisory to millions of Toyota owners to remove them. The company said on Nov. 2 that “there is no evidence to support” any other conclusion, and added that its claim was backed up by the federal traffic safety agency.

But, in fact, the agency had not signed on to the explanation, and it issued a sharp rebuke. Toyota’s statement was “misleading and inaccurate,” the agency said. “This matter is not closed.”

The effect on Toyota’s business is already being felt. Its sales in the United States in January are expected to drop 11 percent from a year earlier, and its market share in the United States is likely to fall to its lowest point since 2006, according to Edmunds.com, an automotive research Web site.

The company has not yet projected the cost of its recalls and lost sales. But a prolonged slowdown in sales could substantially hurt a company that once minted profit.

Toyota’s handling of the problem is a story of how a long-trusted carmaker lost sight of one of its bedrock principles.

In Toyota lore, the ultimate symbol of the company’s attention to detail is the “andon cord,” a rope that workers on the assembly line can pull if something is wrong, immediately shutting down the entire line. The point is to fix a small problem before it becomes a larger one.

But in the broadest sense, Toyota itself failed to pull the andon cord on this issue, and treated a growing safety issue as a minor glitch — a point the company’s executives are now acknowledging in a series of humbling apologies.

“Every day is a lesson and there is something to be learned,” Yoshimi Inaba, Toyota’s top executive in North America, said at the Detroit auto show in January. “This was a hard lesson.”

In Davos, Switzerland, on Friday, Akio Toyoda, the grandson of Toyota’s founder who now heads the company, told a Japanese broadcaster that he was “deeply sorry” for the problems.

Toyota’s safety problems may prove to be a hard lesson for the N.H.T.S.A., as well. Six separate investigations were conducted by the agency into consumer complaints of unintended acceleration, and none of them found defects in Toyotas other than unsecured floor mats.

In at least three cases, the agency denied petitions for further investigative action because it did not see a pattern of defects and because of a “need to allocate and prioritize N.H.T.S.A.’s limited resources” elsewhere, according to agency documents.

The investigations, and Toyota’s handling of the problem, will be the subject of Congressional hearings.

But the publicity surrounding the accident near San Diego, and Toyota’s repeated inability to quell consumer concerns with a definitive solution, has also prompted a flood of lawsuits reminiscent of the litigation a decade ago arising out of the rollovers of Ford Explorers equipped with Firestone tires.

In addition to cases related to individual accidents, several class-action suits have been filed against Toyota. The cases are expected to focus on why the government and the carmaker were unable to identify problems beyond the floor mats, despite mounting instances of runaway cars.

David Ennis, a Washington lawyer, said he was working on three lawsuits that had been in the works for five months. “Over the last 24 hours, everybody’s a Toyota lawyer now,” he said last week.

Toyota now believes that the trouble with its cars is twofold — a combination of loose floor mats that can interfere with accelerator pedals, and a pedal that itself can stick when a driver depresses it.

Toyota has told its dealers that it will announce its fix for the faulty accelerators on Monday, but has yet to release details. The CTS Corporation, the supplier of the pedals used in recalled models, is making replacement parts. But Toyota is also expected to try to repair or modify the pedals in some vehicles.

Before last August, Toyota had issued three limited recalls to replace floor mats and change an interior part that could catch on accelerator pedals.

But after the fatal crash near San Diego, and the public release of the 911 tape, Toyota was forced to, as it said in the fall, “take a closer look.”

That crash, said Clarence M. Ditlow, executive director of the Center for Auto Safety in Washington, “was a watershed event.”

“It captured on tape the deaths of four people in an uncontrolled acceleration where the driver was an experienced highway patrol officer,” he said. “If he couldn’t bring the car under control, who could?”

A lawyer for the Saylor family said he wished that the federal government had acted more quickly about concerns over the sudden acceleration.

“They’re clearly starting to become more interested in the problem and more attentive to it,” said the lawyer, John Gomez, of San Diego. “Do I wish they would have done more sooner? Obviously.”

In one federal inquiry on Toyota models built from 2002 to 2005, investigators found that 20 percent of the 432 complaints studied involved “sudden or unintended acceleration.”

But no defects were uncovered in any of the vehicles, and the rate of incidents was considered “unremarkable” in the context of the millions of cars on the road.

The petitioner in that case, Jordan Ziprin of Phoenix, said the regulators had focused exclusively on mechanical issues with his car, a 2002 Camry.

“I believe this is an electronic issue, but they have been avoiding that possibility entirely,” Mr. Ziprin said in an interview.

Several lawsuits against Toyota also suggest that the company’s electronic system could be at fault.

A Toyota spokesman said the company had looked extensively at its computerized electronic throttle system, which controls the speed of its cars, and had found no faults.

“If we found anything, we would take appropriate action,” said the spokesman, Mike Michels. “But we continue to think it’s entirely unlikely that an electronic malfunction is the cause.”

A lawyer for a California man whose wife died in a 2007 crash of a Camry said the company was avoiding a potentially more pervasive problem by focusing on mats and stuck pedals, rather than its electronics.

“There are thousands of these complaints, and we’re not seeing floor mats and we’re not seeing stuck throttles,” said the lawyer, Donald H. Slavik, of Milwaukee. The traffic safety agency “simply doesn’t have the resources to analyze the electronic systems of these cars.”

The agency, which is part of the Transportation Department, has stepped up its oversight of Toyota drastically since the fatal accident that involved the Saylor family.

Agency officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the case was still being investigated, say their responsibility is to identify defects in autos, not to develop remedies to fix them. That responsibility, these officials said, rests with the automaker.

Many complaints by consumers were eliminated by the agency during its investigations because of possible driver error, or the lack of sufficient information about the circumstances of the incidents.

The agency separated braking problems from acceleration issues, further narrowing the number of complaints that could be linked to a faulty pedal or an electronic malfunction. Cases involving brief periods of acceleration were also considered separately from those that involved prolonged, high-speed incidents, many of which involved accidents.

Sean Kane, whose consulting firm, Safety Research and Strategies, counts plaintiffs’ lawyers among its clients, contends that the agency did not push Toyota for more data, and too quickly accepted the company’s explanations about floor-mat problems.

“The agency has not been very forceful with Toyota at all,” Mr. Kane said. The agency “always took the low-hanging fruit for an explanation, which is the floor mat.”

The discussions between federal officials and Toyota intensified in December, when the acting chief of the agency, Ronald Medford, flew to Japan to hold meetings with senior company executives, according to a government official with knowledge of the trip who was not authorized to speak publicly.

On Jan. 19, two days before the recall for the sudden-acceleration problem, Mr. Inaba of Toyota met in Washington with Mr. Medford and the new head of the agency, David Strickland.

The mounting number of complaints and accidents has led the agency to be more outspoken than it usually is during continuing investigations.

Last week, the transportation secretary, Ray LaHood, said in an interview with a Chicago radio station that Toyota had halted production of recalled vehicles “because we asked them to.”

Indeed, Toyota had to be told by regulators to shut down production and suspend sales of the cars and trucks in the latest recall until it had the parts necessary to fix them. It was yet another example of a slow response from a company long known for its meticulous approach to building cars and servicing customers.

Mr. Michels, the Toyota spokesman, said the company never before had to halt production or stop selling millions of vehicles involved in a recall.

“It’s not a typical case,” he said. “Usually in a ‘stop sale’ it’s a very small quantity.”

In its attempts to play down the problem, Toyota may have raised more doubts among consumers.

“It thinks it can control this crisis, and in the process has thrown its own credibility out the window,” said Mr. Kane, the safety consultant whose firm has documented thousands of reports of unintended acceleration.

Some owners of recalled Toyotas are now saying they are afraid to drive them. “I live only a half mile from the office and I drive there,” said Elaine Byrnes, a Camry owner in Los Angeles. “If I had to go farther, I wouldn’t consider it.”

And the scrutiny of Toyotas will not end with its new plan to replace the pedals. Accidents are receiving swift attention from federal regulators.

On Dec. 26, a 2008 Toyota Avalon — one of the cars under recall — crashed just outside of Dallas. A police officer in Southlake, Tex., Roderick Page, said in an interview that “for undetermined reasons, the vehicle left the main roadway, and went through a metal pipe fence, striking a tree and causing the vehicle to flip and land upside down in a pond.”

All four people in the car died. “There was no evidence that they attempted to hit the brake or slow down,” he said. “Honestly, my reaction is, ‘Wow.’ ”

Two weeks later, an investigator from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration visited Southlake to inspect the car, accompanied by a Toyota engineer. Mr. Page said one factor they immediately ruled out was the floor mats, which were in the trunk.

Matt Richtel contributed reporting from San Francisco, Clifford Krauss from Houston and Matthew L. Wald from Washington.

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