592
幾年前將它的品質和可靠性測試報告當成大事
消基會最近公布高鐵滿意度調查，數據也比以前退步。 台灣高鐵是政府與民間合作的BOT案，由政府擔任三千多億元融資案的連帶保證人， 並協助其財務重整的降息計畫。 ...
591
Edvard Munch: The Frieze of Life
590
2009年 06月 02日 12:59
通用汽車的啟示：好公司為何會變壞
我
在 密歇根州長大﹐所以通用汽車(General Motors)申請破產保護就像發生在我家門口的事。曾幾何時美國市場上一半多的汽車都是通用汽車生產的﹐而現在﹐這家幾十年來一直雄居全球工業界頭把交 椅的公司成了政府的監護對象。通用汽車走到今天這步田地﹐並不是因為某項謀劃不周的決定而一失足成千古恨。相反﹐它是一路低頭邁著小碎步走進死胡同的。通 用汽車就像一個每天吸兩包煙的煙民﹐它在慢性自殺。不可靠的汽車質量、有毒的勞工環境、品牌認同的混亂、笨重的動力總成﹐與零部件供應商 的糟糕關係以及低於平均水平的汽車轉售價值﹐這些都是通用汽車公司管理模式的慢性病症狀﹐這種模式將盈利看作是一種遊戲﹐而不是記分板﹐它更看重金融花招 而不是有創新性的工程設計﹐它讓那些擁有MBA學位的外行去管理汽車業的內行。
不到八個月前﹐時任通用汽車董事長的瓦格納(Rick Wagoner)還吹噓說﹐這家公司準備再當100年業界領頭羊﹐能說出這種話的人要麼是傻樂觀﹐要麼是不可救藥的想入非非者。
自 打我記事起﹐為通用汽車辯解的人就一直聲稱這家公司正在取得進步﹐他們曾經是對的。很長一段時間內通用汽車一直在不斷取得進步﹐但從40年前起這家公司就 開始走下坡路了。雪佛蘭美宜堡(Chevrolet Malibu)和雪佛蘭ZR1(Corvette ZR1)、別克昂科雷(Buick Enclave)和凱迪拉克CTS-V(Cadillac CTS-V)：無論以什麼標準衡量﹐這些車型都可謂出色。問題在於﹐跟通用汽車其他車型一貫的平庸相比﹐這些車型顯得尤為卓越。多年來﹐卓越在通用只是偶 爾變異的結果﹐而不是盡一切努力追求的熱情。
一家公司如果一開始就處於全球規模最大的經濟體﹐在一個巨大的、難以滲透的市場內佔有主導份額﹐它就能憑借慣性在很長時間內保持動力－－但只要有足夠的時間﹐並做出足夠多越來越短視的決策﹐這家公司最終會失去前進的勢頭。
通 用汽車並不是當前唯一一家熄火的公司。摩托羅拉(Motorola)、花旗(Citi)、NASCAR、星巴克(Starbucks)、索尼 (Sony)、聯合航空公司(United Airlines)、百代(Emi)、柯達(Kodak)、意大利航空公司(Alitalia)、電信公司Sprint Nextel、《紐約時報》(the New York Times)、聯合利華公司(Unilever)、美國在線(AOL)和克萊斯勒(Chrysler)－－這些只是少數似乎失去了護身符的企業。事實是﹐ 每家企業都是成功的﹐直到它不再成功的那一天﹐而如今有很多不再成功的企業。
怎麼會出現這種情況？昨天的偶像怎麼會成了今天的敗將？卓越品質怎麼會退化？是什麼導致了公司的焦躁？這些問題都很重要。當一家公司出現嚴重問題時﹐所有人都會蒙受損失：股東、員工和顧客。多年來﹐我眼見許多公司迷失了方向。以下就是這一切的發生過程。
首先﹐重力的影響。有 三大物理學法則往往會拉平成功的弧度。第一個是大數法則。我們都知道﹐一家大公司要實現增長比小公司難得多。要讓一家規模400億美元的公司增長25%﹐ 就需要創造10個10億美元的新業務。而一家規模4,000萬美元的公司增長同樣幅度只需要一個1,000萬美元的新業務。企業就跟生物學的原理一樣﹐體 形大者成長較慢。
然後是平均律。沒有哪家公司的表現能夠無限期地超出平均水平。韋爾奇(Jack Welch)在通用電氣(GE)任職的最後五年中﹐通用電氣市值從略低於1,400億美元增長到逾4,000億美元。要想保持這種熾熱的增長速度 ﹐2001年9月接替韋爾奇的伊梅爾特(Jeff Immelt)就得讓通用電氣的市值在2006年8月達到逾1.2萬億美元－－但這種情況永遠不可能出現。隨著你將相關時限從一年延長到5年、10年﹐超 出平均水平的可能性會迅速趨近於零。從長遠看﹐可以說沒有永遠增長的公司。
最後﹐是收益遞減規則。任何著重於收入增長或提高利潤的項目的 回報都會逐漸減少。當市場成熟時﹐營利增長放緩﹔當快要啃到硬骨頭時﹐生產率增速也會放緩。逐漸地﹐為了增加收益﹐需要付出越來越多的努力﹐而生產效率卻 越來越低。儘管這三條法則不像重力法則那樣硬性﹐但要克服它們也絕非易事──而且很少有公司能做到這點。
第二﹐戰略也會消亡。就像人類一樣﹐戰略在它們產生的那一刻就開始走向死亡。儘管死亡可以被推遲﹐卻是無可避免的。下面剖析了戰略消亡的三種主要原因。
聰 明的戰略會被復製。惠普（Hewlett-Packard）最終學會了如何像戴爾（Dell）一樣低成本地生產電腦。捷藍（JetBlue）從西南航空公 司（Southwest Airline）的經營之道中學了一招。Cialis&Levitra闖進了Viagra的領地。Facebook在“聚友網 ”（MySpace）開創的社交網絡模式上建立起自己的業務。儘管有些戰略比其他戰略更難摹仿（尤其是那些產生網絡效應的戰略）﹐但多數都可以被孜孜不倦 的競爭者破解。
再受尊崇的戰略都會被取代。數碼相機讓膠片變得過時。可下載音樂擠掉了CD的市場。Skype讓其使用者可以繞開昂貴的長途電話費。在線新聞綜合網站掏空了報紙的利潤。有時新進者會改進現有的戰略﹐但偶爾也會把它驅逐出局。
原本利潤可觀的戰略會被榨幹利潤空間。互聯網使議價能力發生了戲劇性的轉移──從生產者轉移到消費者。擁有近乎完全信息的消費者能夠壓低幾乎任何商品的價格。對於很多公司而言﹐擁有充分信息的消費者比整備精良的競爭者構成更大的贏利威脅。
在 生命中﹐死亡可能會突如其來。在商界中﹐這永遠不應該發生。只要方法得當﹐戰略的過時情況在很大程度上是可以預測的﹐但很少有公司會花力氣去這樣做。雖然 一個步履蹣跚的老者無法棄掉他衰朽的軀殼﹐換上一個年輕而有活力的身體﹐一家公司卻可以──至少在理論上行得通。當公司無法逃出行將失效的戰略的掌控時﹐ 它才會死亡。
第三﹐變化總會發生。想一想曾經以指數遞增速度發生變化的那些事情吧：排列出的基因序列數量、聯接到互聯網的 機器數量、全球的手機數量、二氧化碳排放量、全球的可用帶寬量、以及信息本身的產量。過去﹐有很多東西保護行業內現有企業免受創造性破壞的強烈沖擊﹐包括 監管壁壘、技術門檻、銷售渠道壟斷和資本約束。但在多數行業中﹐這些壁壘已經在瓦解。不連續性破壞了舊有的商業模式﹐為新進者創造了機會。所以戰略不只是 會消亡﹐它還比以前消亡得更快──而且這是不爭的事實。在過去幾十年中﹐產品優勢和技術優勢消逝的速度越來越快。同時﹐當期收益狀況和未來收益狀況之間的 關聯性也變得越來越弱。
事實是﹐多數企業從來就不是為了變化而建立的──它們是為了永遠出色而高效地做好一件事情而建立的。這就是為什麼 許多產業中的企業會適應不了變化而被整體淘汰出局──就像大型製藥業、出版業、唱片音樂業和美國的大型航空公司。在變化如疾風驟雨而非輕風細雨般來臨的時 代﹐公司能繼續獲得成功的唯一途徑就是在被逼無奈之前徹底進行自我創新──即使是最聰明的公司﹐想要在這點上做得漂亮也很難。
Gary Hamel
（Gary Hamel是管理作家和顧問。他寫有《領導革命》、《為未來而競爭》和《管理的未來》。他是倫敦商學院訪問教授和管理實驗室主任。）
GM: Why Good Companies Go Bad
I grew up in Michigan, so the bankruptcy filing of General Motors strikes close to home. There was a time when GM made more than half the cars sold in the United States. But now, what was for decades the world's largest industrial company, is a ward of the state. GM's failure isn't the result of one spectacularly ill-conceived decision─the company didn't jump off a cliff. Instead, it meandered into mediocrity, one small short-sighted step at a time. Like a two-pack a day smoker, GM committed suicide in degrees.
Dodgy quality, a toxic labor environment, incoherent brand identities, clunky power-trains, adversarial supplier relations, and subterranean resale values─these were the chronic symptoms of a management model that regarded profits as the game rather than the scoreboard, that valued financial finagling more highly than inspired engineering, and elevated MBA-types to rule over the car guys.
A scant eight months ago, GM's then-chairman, Rick Wagoner, boasted that his company was 'ready to lead for 100 years to come' ─a comment that only could have been made by someone who was either naively optimistic or hopelessly delusional.
Ever since I can remember, GM's defenders have been arguing that the company was making progress; and they were right. GM has been getting better for a very long time─but it's been 40 years since it was the best. The Chevrolet Malibu and Corvette ZR1, the Buick Enclave and Cadillac CTS-V: these are exceptional cars by anyone's standards. Problem is, they are even more exceptional when judged against the persistent ordinariness of GM's other products. For years, excellence at GM has been an occasional aberration, rather than an all-consuming passion.
A company can coast for a long time when it starts with a dominant share of an enormous and hard-to-penetrate market in the world's largest economy─but given enough time, and enough incrementally myopic decisions, and it will eventually run out of momentum.
GM is not the only company that's sputtering right now. Motorola, Citi, NASCAR, Starbucks, Sony, United Airlines, EMI, Kodak, Alitalia, Sprint Nextel, the New York Times, Unilever, AOL and Chrysler─these are just a few of the businesses that seem to have lost their mojo. Truth is, every organization is successful until it's not─and today, there are a lot that are not.
How does this happen? How do yesterday's icons become today's also-rans? How does excellence degrade? What are the causes of corporate dysphoria? These are important questions. When an organization stumbles badly everyone loses: shareholders, employees and customers. Through the years, I've seen a lot of companies lose their way. Here's how it happens.
First, gravity wins. There are three physical laws that tend to flatten the arc of success. The first is the law of large numbers. We all know that it's a lot harder to grow a big company than a small one. To grow a $40 billion company by 25% requires the creation of ten new billion-dollar businesses. To grow a $40 million company by the same percentage requires only one new $10 million business. In business as in biology, big things grow slower.
Then there's the law of averages. No company can outperform the mean indefinitely. During the last five years of Jack Welch's tenure at GE, the company's market value grew from just under than $140 billion to more than $400 billion. To maintain that torrid pace, Jeff Immelt, who took over from Welch in September 2001, would have had to grow GE's value to more than $1.2 trillion dollars by August 2006─but that was never going to happen. As you lengthen the relevant timeframe from one year to five and then to ten, the probability of out-performing the average rapidly approaches zero. In the long-run there are no growth companies.
Lastly, there's the law of diminishing returns. The pay-off to any program focused on revenue growth or margin enhancement tends to shrink over time. Top-line growth slows as markets mature, and productivity growth slows as the knife scrapes closer to the bone. Over time, it takes more and more effort to produce less and less in the way of incremental returns. While these three laws aren't as unyielding as gravity, they're tough to overcome─and few companies manage it.
Second, strategies die. Like human beings, strategies start to die the moment they're born. While death can be delayed, it can't be avoided. Autopsies reveal three primary causes of death.
Clever strategies get replicated. Hewlett-Packard ultimately learned how to make computers as cheaply as Dell. JetBlue took a chapter out of Southwest Airlines' playbook. Cialis and Levitra intruded on Viagra's turf. And Facebook built on the social networking model pioneered by MySpace. While some strategies are harder to imitate than others (particularly those that yield network effects), most can be decoded by dedicated rivals.
Venerable strategies get supplanted. Digital cameras made film obsolete. Downloadable music deflated the market for CDs. Skype allowed its users to sidestep expensive tariffs. And online news aggregators hollowed out newspaper profits. Sometimes newcomers improve on an existing strategy, but occasionally they shoot it out of the sky.
Profitable strategies get eviscerated. The Internet has produced a dramatic shift in bargaining power─from producers to consumers. Armed with near perfect information, customers are able to batter down prices on just about everything. For many companies, well-informed customers are now a bigger threat to margins than well-armed competitors.
In life, death can come as a shock. In business, it never should. With the right metrics, strategy decay is largely predictable, though few companies bother to track it. And while a doddering granddad can't abandon his decrepit body for a young and vital one, a company can─at least in theory. Companies die when they can't escape the grasp of a dying strategy.
Third, change happens. Think of the number of things that have been changing at an exponential pace: the number of genes sequenced, the number of devices connected to the Internet, the number of mobile phones in the world, CO2 emissions, the amount of bandwidth available globally, and the production of knowledge itself. In the past, there were many things that protected incumbents from the gale-force winds of creative destruction, including regulatory barriers, technology hurdles, distribution monopolies, and capital constraints. But in most industries these bulwarks have been crumbling. Discontinuities undermine old business models and create opportunities for newcomers. So not only do strategies die, they die quicker than they used to─and that's a fact. Over the past few decades, product- and technology-based advantages have become more fleeting. At the same time, the correlation between current and future earnings performance has become progressively weaker.
Fact is, most businesses were never built to change─they were built to do one thing exceedingly well and highly efficiently─forever. That's why entire industries can get caught out by change─industries like big pharma, publishing, recorded music and the major U.S. airlines. In a world where change is shaken rather than stirred, the only way a company can renew its lease on success is by reinventing itself root and branch, before it has to─a feat that even the smartest companies have trouble pulling off.
Gary Hamel
Gary Hamel is a management author and consultant. His books include 'Leading the Revolution,' 'Competing for the Future,' and 'The Future of Management.' He's a visiting professor at London Business School and director of the Management Lab.
589
Herbert Simon的博士論文幾可拿諾貝爾經濟學獎
年青的Drucker當然可以推想生意差的時候 公司的慷慨 如何保持下去
As GM Goes So Goes California in Pensions: Roger Lowenstein
Bloomberg - USA
But observers such as Peter Drucker, then a young consultant, wondered what would happen if GM's business turned south while its pension obligation remained ...
588
卡洛玲子
剛剛去 goo 辭書 查"格" 竟然有三個"新語" 我想"漢字人行道" 收入你的 "格"
有格如此 管它多少無恥"勢"
三年有成 說盡千萬義士事
587
峰兄
thanks for your 資料
我想翁先生的許多想法 包栝這點 都錯誤的
管制圖 (沒錢提) 的目的正是要找特殊因和共同因 再分別採取相應的改善措施 參考第四代管理
586
http://blog.roodo.com/michaelcarolina/archives/9131453.html#comment-19265199
......延伸閱讀：
HC的網址：http://www.deming.com.tw
台灣戴明圈 A Taiwanese Deming Circle ： http://demingcircle.blogspot.com/
哇 榮幸 胡小姐給我十幾年前的SITE連結
很巧 昨天寫
"昨天無意中回SU 參訪者十來萬 我ㄧ年多沒回去SU 連 PASS WORD都忘了 去年朋友從大陸貼MAIL 我還不知道
或許是品質學會將我 LINK去那 所以領導手冊等偏千多人看"
SU= Simon University
2004年紀念 HERBERT SIMON的 "新聞台" ----這是PCHOME的 記得那時候 常常接到妙文"從異鄉發現台灣" 這SU 是很值得懷念的合作成績
後來再花ㄧ年搞兩 BLOGS QUALITY TAIWAN 等等
2007年 發現可以在GOOGLE的 BLOGSPOT 寫 順便賺點外快 沒想到走入中國某朋友的說法:"神人" 意思是一口氣可以寫二十幾BLOGS 當然這些品質堪虞
近三月前 我還開始試驗 手邊沒ADSL等 如何維護這些"筆記本"
我現在可能"戒BLOGS"還沒成功
謝謝 妳/妳們精采的"部落"
5月18日 我聽某都蘭的朋友說 都蘭意思類似"朋友 團結 ㄧ體 幹大事去" 就用它說謝
585
據說建中可能步再關學生
給學生ㄧ小時午餐
584
昨天無意中回SU 參訪者十來萬
我ㄧ年多沒回去 PASS WORD忘了 去年朋友從大陸貼MAIL 我還不知道
或許是品質學會將我LINK去那 所以領導手冊等偏千多人看
583
一早上NTU真理堂旁滿是昨夜留下的菸屁股
文學院的"工友"將白板擦猛往牆的黃磁片打
路上的 猛掃落葉
582
| "留言主題：請鍾台長幫一個忙,謝謝您 |
| |
我2009/5/31 才看到楊兄2008/5/27的信
整整一年過去啦 意思是我一年沒回去simon university
581
我開始追查我的朋友蘇先生
他的blog很有意思啦:
*****
追憶SARS 期間的BenQ 演講
2006-01-18 08:30:53 | 人氣(162)
2006/1/18讀新聞報導：
BenQ unveiled new mobile phones, which the Taiwanese electronics company said are part of a shift toward higher-end models with higher profit margins.
昨日是明基與西門子行動事業部整併的第100天。明基在德國柏林和北京同步進行3款新機的發表會。李焜耀說，過去西門子行動事業部傾向「重歐輕亞」。未來 新品牌將採取「強亞重歐」策略，在亞洲增加更多資源，如研發人才等，且將從亞洲市場角度，來發展各項產品；未來所有產品將以全球同步上市為基調，除非有特 殊地域性的產品如3G（第3代行動通訊）手機，才會以區域的方式推出。明基還預計將中國和台灣地區的手機研發人員，增加至1000人左右。
-----
我知道明基約在1984年。我的電子所同事蘇錦坤先生是他們早期的幹部，他心眼好，之後在園區的一次Acer 的龍騰計畫還說能不能見施先生……
之後他調去德國，我也在外商服務。
前幾年，在報上看到新品牌BenQ，很驚訝…..
我有幸在SARS 肆虐、蘋果日報剛創刊之際到這家名公司（戴口罩）演講。當時沒見到李焜耀先生，由副總主持。（之後，他們大幅提升、改組…….）。
新廠與1980s 的廠房比，當然不可同日而語。當時，廠內還有很先進的紅外線量體溫設備………
現在看他們走出國際化的第一步，衷心祝賀。
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