兩名負責波音737 MAX飛機研發的高管為設計流程辯護。Boeing expects 737 Max crisis to cost $18.6bn. Report Defends 'Thorough Work' In Certifying Boeing 737 Max — But Suggests Changes

--2020.9.14

兩名負責波音737 MAX飛機研發的高管為設計流程辯護

兩名負責波音公司737 MAX飛機研發的高管對眾議院調查人員表示，儘管發生了兩起致命墜機事件，但波音公司的設計流程並無缺陷，這番表態與該公司其他高管承認過去的工程設計失誤的態度形成了鮮明對比。

---2020.1.29



Boeing has placed the total cost of the 737 Max crisis at more than double its previous estimate.

Aircraft maker logged its first annual loss in more than two decades amid fallout from grounding

FT.COM

Boeing expects 737 Max crisis to cost $18.6bn


***

NATIONAL

Report Defends 'Thorough Work' In Certifying Boeing 737 Max — But Suggests Changes

Amid difficult questions about the steps taken by Boeing and regulators, the review commissioned by the Department of Transportation largely validated the process that put the jetliner in the air.

A pair of Boeing 737 Max 8 jetliners plummeted from the sky in 2018 and 2019, killing hundreds of passengers and eventually prompting officials to ground the aircraft model worldwide — but the process that allowed the craft in the air in the first place is generally sound, according to a review commissioned by U.S. regulators.

An independent committee established by the Department of Transportation published its findings in a 68-page report Thursday. (Skip down to read the whole report.) And broadly, the group found the certification process laid out by the Federal Aviation Administration to be effective, with some changes needed for improvement.

"What we saw was a thorough work by aviation professionals," one of the two co-chairs, former Air Line Pilots Association President Lee Moak, told journalists on a conference call explaining the findings. Together with retired Air Force Gen. Darren McDew, Moak oversaw a five-member panel with a mix of transportation industry executives and former regulators.

"However," Moak added, "we saw where you could improve the system."

Among their recommendations for the FAA:

• Extend the requirement for Safety Management Systems, or formal, structured programs for risk management. The FAA already requires them for airlines and airports, but the committee recommended applying the mandate to "design and manufacturing organizations," too.
• Do a better job gathering, analyzing and easing access to aviation data.
• Improve collaboration with the FAA's counterparts in other countries.
• Reevaluate and bolster the workforce, including "an aggressive recruitment campaign to encourage students to pursue careers at the FAA."

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What was not among its recommendations was any significant adjustment to the FAA's Organization Designation Authorization, a program by which the agency can delegate elements of its certification process to certain approved private individuals or companies. The program drew controversy last year when lawmakers questioned how Boeing ended up being responsible for reviewing changes to its own design on the 737 Max.

"Safety experts have long raised concerns that the [ODA] program leaves the fox in charge of the henhouse," Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., wrote in a letter to the Department of Transportation last March, just days after the FAA grounded the Max.

"In short," he added, "the staff responsible for regulating aircraft safety are answerable to the manufacturers who profit from cutting corners, not the American people who may be put at risk."

Further concern surfaced last week with the revelation that Boeing employees had mocked the FAA in internal messages and gloated about the ease with which the plane was approved. "This airplane," read one note about the craft, which would later be involved in the deaths of 346 people, "is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys."

The mother of a victim of the Ethiopian Airlines crash, which killed scores of passengers last year, bears a sign representing the dead passengers before a congressional hearing on the Boeing 737 Max 8 back in June.

Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images

But in its review, the panel found no evidence that the outcome of the certification process would have been different if the FAA had not delegated some of the steps.

"The FAA's delegation system is an appropriate and effective tool for conducting aircraft certification," the committee concluded in the executive summary of its report. "It relies on effective standards, oversight and communication between stakeholders."

NATIONAL

As New CEO Takes Charge, Boeing's Challenges Remain

BUSINESS

Boeing Employees Mocked FAA In Internal Messages Before 737 Max Disasters

The review isn't the first to be compiled since the aircraft was grounded. Last October, an FAA-commissioned panel known as the Joint Authorities Technical Review lambasted both the agency and Boeing for failing to properly evaluate the new automated flight control system that directly caused the crashes.

The Justice Department and Transportation Department's Office of Inspector General also are investigating the Boeing plane's certification.

The airline manufacturing giant — now helmed by CEO David Calhoun after Dennis Muilenburg stepped down from the post last month — responded to Thursday's report with gratitude and a commitment to take its findings seriously.

"We will study these recommendations closely," a company spokesperson said in a brief statement, "as we continue to work with government and industry stakeholders to enhance the certification process."

The FAA also welcomed the report's findings.

"I was pleased to see that the committee recommended we advance the use of Safety Management Systems throughout all sectors of the aviation industry," Administrator Steve Dickson said in a statement released by the FAA.

"The agency will carefully consider the committee's work, along with the recommendations identified in various investigative reports and other analyses, as we take steps to enhance our aircraft certification processes."

Read the full report

"新經濟領域" (歐洲股市)：科技、軟體、半導體、電信、媒體、零售、醫療保健與製藥

 

相較於以往而言，歐洲股市看起來與科技股權重較大的納斯達克指數更像了。但表面現象可能具有欺騙性。 投資者正密切關注是否會出現一種完形轉換(Gestalt switch)。根據美銀美林(Bank of America Merrill Lynch) 8月份對基金經理的調查，投資者當時已在質疑為數不多的科技巨頭還能帶領美國股市上漲多久，並已開始將持倉轉向海外標的，尋找下一批表現出色的個股。 歐洲斯托克600指數今年以來已累計下跌12%，而標普500指數累計上漲3%。其原因在於，歐洲市場上的銀行、汽車和能源公司等“舊經濟”板塊占比較大，在歐洲斯托克600指數中，科技、電信和醫療保健等“新經濟”板塊占比僅30%左右.。而在美國股市上，這一比例超過60%。 但摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)的分析師最近在給客戶的一份報告中表示：“實際情況正發生變化。”在歐洲股市上，新經濟領域股票的比重正加速上升。在涵蓋範圍較窄的歐元區斯托克50指數中，科技股現在是最大的類股。對於青睞成長型股票的投資者來說，這可能成為已超買的納斯達克以外的另一個替代選項嗎？ 並非如此。首先，這種以新經濟板塊為方向的調整主要源於新冠疫情危機對傳統行業類股市值的嚴重破壞。直到今年1月份，成長型股票在歐洲MSCI明晟指數中的比重多年來一直沒有變化。 歐洲市場前景真正改善的一個信號將是，該地區新經濟類股的表現增強，而非舊經濟類股的表現變差。然而，歐洲科技股2020年以來以及過去十年間的表現都遜於美國科技股。 在疫情發生之前，歐洲兩大科技巨擘——企業軟件巨頭SAP SE和半導體設備製造商艾司摩爾公司(ASML Holding NV)——的增長前景就已遠遜於Netflix Inc. (NFLX)和亞馬遜公司(Amazon.com Inc., AMZN)。新冠疫情給網購和線上娛樂消費帶來永久性提振的可能性進一步拉大了這種差距。阿姆斯特丹或許有一些前途光明的初創企業，但美國和中國的大型科技公司還不需要有太多擔心。 相較於估值可能過高的美國巨頭而言，歐洲科技公司總體來看也不便宜：美國和歐洲新經濟公司的市盈率都已經比較高了。 當然，如果投資者繼續拋售矽谷公司股票，或者尋找新冠疫苗的進程出現加速，那麼相對於美國股市而言，歐洲股市剛開始的反彈很可能會持續下去。不過，在這種情境下，推動歐洲股市上漲的將是對舊經濟板塊最終將得以喘口氣的預期，從而在客觀上再次提升舊經濟板塊的相對權重。 從長遠來看，一個地區相對於另一個地區的繁榮程度，在很大程度上取決於該地區關鍵的特長行業的增長潛力。到目前為止，歐洲最近在這方面取得的進展還只是數字層面的海市蜃樓。如果投資者需要為短期內向該地區投入更多資金找一個理由，那就是容易被炒作的歐洲科技類股走勢相對疲軟，而不是因為歐洲科技股出現了任何新的走強勢頭。

Boeing discloses new flaw with 787 jet as problems mount. FAA對"波音夢想飛機"可能長達近10年的質量控制疏漏展開調查

Boeing: The U.S. aviation giant said Tuesday that it expected deliveries of its 787 Dreamliner to be delayed as it and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration look into quality-control concerns with the wide-body jet. The plane’s relative fuel efficiency has made it popular with All Nippon Airways, United Airlines, Japan Airlines, American Airlines, Etihad Airways, Qatar Airways and Air Canada.

The company disclosed a new problem with the manufacturing of its 787 Dreamliner that will put a further crimp in its aircraft deliveries







CNN.COM


Boeing discloses new flaw with 787 jet as problems mount


FAA對波音夢想飛機可能長達近10年的質量控制疏漏展開調查



根據一份政府內部備忘錄和知情人士透露的消息，波音公司旗下一家787夢想飛機工廠的生產問題，已促使航空安全監管機構對其可能長達近10年的質量控制疏漏進行調查。


What is so special about Boeing 787 Dreamliner?


The airplane's unparalleled fuel efficiency and range flexibility enables carriers to profitably open new routes as well as optimize fleet and network performance. And for their passengers, an experience like none other in the air, with more comfort and less fatigue. The Dreamliner effect. That's a better way to fly.





So the only way the board of directors would sign off on the Dreamliner was to spread the risk among a global chain of suppliers. In December 2003, they agreed to take on half of the estimated $10 billion development cost.


The plan backfired as production problems quickly surfaced.


“I saw total chaos. Boeing bit off more than it could chew,” said Larry Caracciolo, an engineer who spent three years managing 787 supplier quality.


First, there were problems with the moulding of the new plastics. Then parts made by different suppliers didn't fit properly. For instance, the nose-and-cockpit section was out of alignment with the rest of the plane, leaving a 0.3-inch gap.


By giving up control of its supply chain, Boeing had lost the ability to oversee each step of production. Problems sometimes weren't discovered until the parts came together at its Everett, Wash., plant.


Fixes weren't easy, and cultures among the suppliers often clashed.


“It seemed like the Italians only worked three days a week. They were always on vacation. And the Japanese, they worked six days a week,” said Jack Al-Kahwati, a former Boeing structural weight engineer.


Even simple conversations between Boeing employees and those from the suppliers working in-house in Everett weren't so simple. Because of government regulations controlling the export of defence-related technology, any talks with international suppliers had to take place in designated conference rooms. Each country had its own, separate space for conversations.


There were also deep fears, especially among veteran Boeing workers, that “we were giving up all of our trade secrets to the Japanese and that they would be our competition in 10 years,” Al-Kahwati said.


As the project fell further behind schedule, pressure mounted. It became increasingly clear that delivery deadlines wouldn't be met.


Each success, no matter how small, was celebrated. The first delivery of a new part or the government certification of an engine would lead to a gathering in one of the engineering building atriums. Banners were hung and commemorative cards – like baseball cards – or coins were handed out.


Those working on the plane brought home a constant stream of trinkets: hats, Frisbees, 787 M&Ms, travel mugs, plane-shaped chocolates, laser pointers and lapel pins. Many of the items can now be found for sale on eBay.


“It kept you going because there was this underlying suspicion that we weren't going to hit these targets that they were setting,” said Matt Henson, who spent five and a half years as an engineer on the project.


The world got its first glimpse of the Dreamliner on July 8, 2007. The date was chosen not because of some production milestone but for public relations value. It was, after all, 7/8/7.


Tom Brokaw served as the master of ceremonies at an event that drew 15,000 people. The crowd was in awe.


It was “beyond experiencing a rock star on stage,” said Dressler, a former Boeing designer. “This thing is so sexy, between the paint job and the lines and the fact that it's here now and you can touch it.”


But like so much of show business, the plane was just a prop. It lacked most flight controls. Parts of the fuselage were temporarily fastened together just for the event. Some savvy observers noted that bolt heads were sticking out from the aircraft's composite skin.


Boeing CEO Jim McNerney told the crowd that the plane would fly within two months.


Instead, the company soon announced the first of what would be many delays. It would be more than two years before the plane's first test flight.


To overcome production problems, Boeing replaced executives and bought several of the suppliers to gain greater control. Work continued at breakneck pace.


“We were competing against time. We were competing against the deadline of delivering the first airplane,” said Roman Sherbak, who spent four years on the project.


Then on a cold, overcast morning in December 2009, it all came together.


A crowd gathered at Paine Field, the airport adjacent to Boeing's factory. The Dreamliner climbed deftly into the sky for a three-hour test flight.


But there were still plenty of glitches, including an onboard fire during a November 2010 test flight. Smoke had entered the cabin from an electronics panel in the rear of the plane. The fleet was grounded for six weeks. This month's safety problems appear unrelated.


Deliveries were pushed back yet again.


Passengers wouldn't first step aboard the plane until Oct. 26, 2011, three and a half years after Boeing first promised.


That first, four-hour journey – from Tokyo to Hong Kong – was more of a party than a flight. Passengers posed for photos as they climbed stairs into the jet. Alcohol flowed freely. Boeing executives were on hand, showing off the plane's new features. Everybody, it seemed, needed to use the bathroom if only to check out the bidet and giant window inside.


More airlines started to fly the plane. Each new route was met with celebration. Travelers shifted itineraries to catch a ride on the new plane.


Boeing had hoped by the end of 2013 to double production of the Dreamliner to 10 planes a month. There are 799 unfilled orders for the plane, which carries a $206.8 million list price, although airlines often negotiate deep discounts.


Then, this month, all the progress came to a jarring halt.


First, a battery ignited on a Japan Airlines 787 shortly after it landed at Boston's Logan International Airport. Passengers had already left the plane, but it took firefighters 40 minutes to put out the blaze.


Problems also popped up on other planes. There were fuel and oil leaks, a cracked cockpit window and a computer glitch that erroneously indicated a brake problem.


Then a 787 flown by Japan's All Nippon Airways made an emergency landing after pilots learned of battery problems and detected a burning smell. Both Japanese airlines grounded their Dreamliner fleets. The FAA, which just days earlier insisted that the plane was safe, did the same for U.S. planes.


Each new aircraft comes with problems. The A380 had its own glitches, including an in-flight engine explosion that damaged fuel and hydraulic lines and the landing flaps. But the unique nature of the 787 worries regulators.


American and Japanese investigators have yet to determine the cause of the problems, and the longer the 787 stays grounded, the more money Boeing must pay airlines in penalties.


“It's been a very expensive process, and it's not going to let up anytime soon,” said Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst with the Teal Group. “At this point, the aircraft still looks very promising. I don't think anybody is talking about cancelling orders but people are nervous about the schedule.”


As investigators try to figure out the cause of the plane's latest problems the world finds itself in a familiar position with the Dreamliner: waiting.

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製程強調組裝容易： put together quick.
Time-lapse: Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner being assembled and painted

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jiH3-rJ-iYc




這次停9架，請能檢查機體的焊接強度？
Construction of composite fuselage section of a Boeing 787







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Boeing 787 Dreamliner


Status

In service


Primary users

All Nippon Airways Japan Airlines American Airlines United Airlines


Produced

2007–present


Number built

977 through July 2020