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豐田文化- 複製豐田DNA的核心關鍵 The Toyota Culture: The Heart and Soul of the Toyota Way
- 作者：傑弗瑞．萊克、麥克．豪瑟斯
- 原文作者：Jeffrey K. Liker、Michael Hoseus
- 譯者：李芳齡
- 出版社：美商麥格羅‧希爾
- 出版日期：2008年09月09日
這笨書竟然將NUMMI 的合作夥伴寫成FORD
"豐 田汽車目前正在與舊通用汽車就如何撤出這家汽車裝配廠New United Motor Manufacturing Inc.（簡稱Nummi）的相關事宜進行商談。一名高管說﹐我們的直覺是需要結束生產。通用汽車走出破產保護之後﹐重組後的通用7月份重新啟動﹐而舊通 用則成為遺留問題。"
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The Health Factory
Cambridge, Mass. — Today, going to an American hospital seems about as safe as parachuting off a bridge. An estimated 98,000 Americans die each year as a result of medical error, and a nearly equal number succumb to infections they acquire in hospitals. Those rates are unacceptable in the world's most medically advanced country.
This month, President Bush signed a bill intended to reduce the rate of medical errors. The legislation authorizes the creation of "patient safety organizations" to which health care providers can report errors and near misses. On the basis of these reports, the organizations will recommend ways to avoid such mistakes. And to reduce disincentives to reporting, the bill prevents information disclosed to these organizations from being used in malpractice lawsuits.
The new legislation is a step in the right direction. It will allow hospitals to study their errors without fear that acknowledging mistakes will lead to reprisals. But within the hospitals themselves lies a far bigger opportunity to reduce the rate of catastrophic medical error, if the hospitals would just follow the example of the world's most successful industrial organizations.
Companies like Toyota, Alcoa and Vanguard differ from one another in the products they produce and the technologies they employ, but they share a management approach that has resulted in a combination of safety, quality, efficiency and responsiveness unmatched by their competitors.
It may seem a stretch to compare a carmaker's, aluminum refiner's, or mutual fund company's operations with a hospital's. But all these companies manage complex processes that require a great deal of problem solving - and they have something important to teach health care.
Typically, health care workers, like employees in many other industries, tend to work around problems when they encounter them, meeting patients' immediate needs but not resolving the problems' root causes. Therefore, people confront "the same problem, every day, for years," as one nurse phrased it to me. These persistent difficulties manifest themselves as regular inefficiencies within the system, and they occasionally lead to catastrophic mistakes.
What sets the non-health care leaders apart is that as they do their work, they are constantly learning how to do it better. Work is designed to reveal even little problems as they occur- well before they cause errors or near misses worthy of being reported. Managers respond to these problems immediately, with rapid experiments aimed at generating sustainable fixes, rather than with workarounds that are constantly repeated. The knowledge that results from this process is then shared through collaborative experimentation in which all employees take part.
A number of American hospitals have tried this approach, with promising results. For example, hospitals in the Pittsburgh Regional Healthcare Initiative addressed a recurring predicament in intensive care. Catheters placed directly into veins or arteries, called central lines, are used to deliver medication swiftly to critically ill patients. But a quarter-million patients nationwide who receive this treatment each year suffer bloodstream infections as a result, and of those, 15 percent die. At one Pittsburgh area hospital, mortality was a staggering 40 percent of those infected, and the cost for each infected patient was $25,000 to $80,000. To eliminate these infections, the hospitals taught themselves to find problems and institute small process enhancements at a rate far faster than a national reporting program will most likely allow. Together, these small fixes added up to a significant improvement.
For periods of days or weeks, the Pittsburgh hospitals observed the placement and maintenance of every central line, looking for minor breaks in routine that could create opportunities for infection. Along the way, they found dozens of factors that were potentially suspect. One hospital realized that in its line-maintenance kits, gloves were stored on the bottom, causing nurses to fish through sterile material with bare hands. Other kits had drapes - sheets that isolate the area on which a nurse or doctor is working - that were either too small to be effective or so large that patients knocked them out of the way.
Other hospitals discovered that only on certain shifts were there doctors expert in placing the more difficult but least infection-prone type of line. And the shifts that lacked such expertise also lacked simple, reliable ways to signal the experts on other shifts to move lines from high-risk to low-risk locations or to remove them entirely when they returned to work.
By quickly identifying and resolving these small procedural problems, the Pittsburgh hospitals as a group cut their central line infection rates in half, and some hospitals were able to cut their individual infection rates nearly to zero. These hospitals and others used a similar approach to solve other problems, like patient falls and faulty medication administration.
To go from working around problems to identifying and solving them required hospital workers to change the way they worked, from the front lines to the senior levels. But the effects were profound. If the rest of the country's hospitals follow that example, the national savings would be measured in tens of thousands of lives and billions of dollars every year.
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Dear David,
Yesterday I read the following book (Chinese Translation) and Thought about you and Sara's essay on the management to complex system.I think some of you might like to read it and discuss about it.
McGraw-Hill: Chasing the Rabbit : Book
Winner of the Shingo Prize for Research and Professional Publication, 2009
How can companies perform so well that their industry ...
- Current
-
- Senior Lecturer at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Senior Fellow at Institute for Healthcare Improvement
- Past
-
- Expert on Leadership and Innovation at Management Consultant
- Assistant Professor at Harvard Business School
- Research Associate at US Congress Office of Technology Assessment
- Education
-
- Harvard Business School
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School of Management
- Connections
-
140 connections - Industry
- Management Consulting
- Websites
Steven J Spear’s Summary
Author of "Decoding the DNA of the Toyota Production System," "Fixing Healthcare from the Inside, Today," and the new book _Chasing the Rabbit: How Market Leaders Outdistance the Competition_
I work with senior leaders, coaching them on how to generate and sustain rates of broad based, high speed improvement and innovation that let's their organization outrace rivals, even in the most hyper competitive markets.
Steven J Spear’s Specialties:
Process excellence
Innovation
Organizational learning
High velocity organizations
Health care reform
Patient safety
Quality of care
Steven J Spear’s Experience
-
Senior Lecturer
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(Educational Institution; Higher Education industry)
2006 — Present (3 years)
-
Senior Fellow
Institute for Healthcare Improvement
(Privately Held; 201-500 employees; Hospital & Health Care industry)
2005 — Present (4 years)
-
Expert on Leadership and Innovation
Management Consultant
(Management Consulting industry)
2005 — 2009 (4 years)
-
Assistant Professor
Harvard Business School
(Educational Institution; 1001-5000 employees; Higher Education industry)
1999 — 2005 (6 years)
Developed and taught 2nd year elective: The Operating Manager
-
Research Associate
US Congress Office of Technology Assessment
(Government Agency; 51-200 employees; Government Administration industry)
1988 — 1989 (1 year)
Electronic Bulls and Bears research team
Steven J Spear’s Education
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Harvard Business School
DBA , Business Management , 1995 — 1999
-
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MS , Mech. Eng. and Management , 1989 — 1993
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School of Management
MS , Management , 1989 — 1993
-
Princeton University
AB , Economics , 1982 — 1986
703
德语媒体 | 2009.08.19
中国太阳能工业后来居上
《德国金融时报》观察了这一新市场的激烈竞争：“尤其中国雄心勃勃，中国政府要使本国的太阳能行业进入世界领先地位，以亿万元的补贴支持这 一工业。中国厂家在现代化的大型工厂中生产晶体硅和硅薄膜太阳电池，按瑞联银行所说，生产成本明显低于德国竞争对手，平均低30%，所以能够以竞争价格扩 大市场份额。
现在，中国已形成了全面出口现代太阳能设备的产业。两年内，中国太阳电池在全世界的市场份额翻了一番，达到30%以上。德国太阳能机械生产厂家曼茨公司的老板认为，'德国大量生产太阳电池的时代将走向终结。'赢家是曼茨公司这样的德国太阳能设备生产厂家和零配件供应厂家。
但是，德国的太阳能行业并没有全军覆没。瑞联银行的分析家胡梅尔说，技术领先和树立品牌是厂家必须要做的事情，'这样客户也会接受高一级的价格'。同时必须降低生产成本，但这在德国很难实现，越来越多的德国厂家将不得不把生产点转移到外国。”
Bildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: 无锡生产的太阳能设备
中国太阳电池生产厂家的龙头企业是无锡尚德太阳能电力公司。近年来，这家由澳大利亚海归博士施正荣创建的公司已经与德国、日本和美国的太阳能公司平起平坐。《南德意志报》介绍了尚德公司的发展历程和现状：
"当这位持澳大利亚护照的中国人八年前在这个数百万人口的城市建立自己的高科技企业尚德公司时，他的朋友和投资者对建设中国第一家太阳电池工厂的计 划都感到无从做起。但市领导被他说服了并投资六百万美元建设工厂。施正荣学成回国不到十年就成了中国最富有、最有名的企业家之一，有八千名职工的尚德公司 去年的销售额为二十亿美元，是五年前的23倍。
德国和美国业已立足市场的硅薄膜生产厂家不得不眼睁睁地看着尚德公司一个接一个地开设工厂，获益于欧洲支持发展太阳能的法律。尚德及其在中国和日本的工厂早已把带动太阳能兴旺发展的西方竞争对手挤入困境。2010年之前，施正荣准备使他公司的生产能力再翻一番。
而在他的故国，把太阳能转换为电力的太阳能模块几乎没有买主。中国的厂家依赖出口生存，90%以上的尚德产品出口国外。中国企业在世界市场占有的份 额多年来快速上升，三分之一的太阳能模块来自中国，而两年前是六分之一。分析家们有一个简单的解释：中国人提供同样质量的产品，但价格低廉多了。"
摘译：王羊
责编：乐然
本文摘自或节译自其它媒体
不代表德国之声观点
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[PDF] The Applicability of Deming's System of Profound Knowledge to Universities...
... of Knowledge that discuss Deming's System of Profound Knowledge. Here are a few of
them. "Communities as Systems" Peter R. Scholtes, Quality Progress, July 1997 ...
www.asq.org/quality-participation/2009/04/process-management/the-applicability-of-demings-system-of-profound-knowledge-to-universities.pdf - Text Version
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但高管們說﹐豐田汽車面臨許多尚未解決的問題﹐其中包括關閉工廠可能產生的數億美元成本。他們說﹐這些因素可能會使最終決定複雜化。
重組後的通用上個月決定放棄這個裝配廠。自1984年豐田和通用成立了該廠以來﹐它大部分時間都在賠錢。該廠每年約生產40萬輛汽車。
有關裝配廠的討論正值豐田新任首席執行長豐田章男(Akio Toyoda)及其管理團隊想辦法解決公司產能過剩問題之際﹐這是拖累豐田財務業績的主要問題。在北美地區﹐產能過剩問題尤其嚴重。本世紀初﹐豐田在北美增加了新的工廠﹐以便滿足當時強勁的需求。
本 月早些時候﹐豐田章男說﹐通用撤出合資企業的決定給我們造成了一些非常棘手的問題。他當時說﹐豐田正在研究形勢﹐並將很快做出決定。通過把該裝配廠的產能 轉移到北美的其他工廠﹐豐田將能大幅提振製造廠的盈利能力。據總部位於美國的咨詢公司CSM Worldwide的數據﹐目前豐田北美裝配廠的開工率約為50%到60%。
Nummi的大部分產品是豐田Tacoma和卡羅拉(Corolla)。為通用生產龐蒂亞克(Pontiac) Vibe的業務將於本月結束。
豐田一名高管說﹐豐田可能會將卡羅拉的生產轉移到加拿大的一個廠子﹐將Tacoma卡車的生產轉到聖安東尼奧﹔一家日本的廠子﹐也許還有一家墨西哥的廠子﹐可能將至少暫時生產卡羅拉和Tacoma。
加州國會議員和州長施瓦辛格(Arnold Schwarzenegge)請豐田拯救Nummi及其4,600個工作崗位﹐其中大部分工人都加入了全美汽車工人聯合會(United Auto Workers)。
豐田高管說﹐公司正努力在本月前就Nummi的未來做出決定﹐不過預計豐田和舊通用的代表本月晚些時候將召開第二次會議﹐以便敲定條款和條件。
一位高管說﹐由於該廠給環境造成的破壞﹐這個位於舊金山郊區費利蒙的廠子在出售前將需要大量資金用於清理。高管們說﹐Nummi自身還有債務。
關閉廠子還可能使人對豐田的穩定就業承諾提出疑問。豐田章男及其新任高管曾承諾﹐在此次全球經濟低迷中不會關閉任何工廠。
豐田高管辯稱﹐直到最後一刻他們都在試圖說服通用汽車維持這家合資企業﹐甚至曾提出在Nummi生產豐田熱銷的油電混合動力車普銳斯(Prius)﹐還有一款通用可以以自己的品牌銷售的車。記者目前無法聯繫到通用汽車發表置評。
Norihiko Shirouzu
