C919客機 ：2026年5月，中歐航空界爆發了一場刺刀見紅的驚天博弈。北京以為捏住了歐洲巨頭的軟肋，但C919的心臟和核心器官都握在西方手中。一旦法美供應商聯手暫停供應發動機及配件，C919生產線將瞬間癱瘓，徹底淪為停機坪上的國際孤兒與廢鐵。 ；暴露“厲害國”多項科技短板 2020 。 中國自製飛機ARJ21通過認證，今年準備投入市場？ (Apr 09, 2015 ？)
新聞追蹤 ：2026年5月，中歐航空界爆發了一場刺刀見紅的驚天博弈。因為歐洲航空安全局（EASA）遲遲不肯給中共國產大飛機C919簽發海外適航證，北京方面索性撕下面具，無限期延期發放中國航空公司訂購的20多架空客飛機進口許可，將整整50億歐元的巨額資金活生生凍結在停機坪上。中南海試圖用這場財務危機逼迫空客CEO去當說客，撬開歐洲監管機構的大門。然而，這場流氓式的「以商逼政」注定要引火燒身。歐洲專家在審查中精準點出了C919的致命缺陷：全球導航系統在歐洲空域面對電磁欺騙時算反邏輯不穩定；由於缺少高難度系統集成經驗，強行用中國數據總線縫合美、法、德的核心零部件，導致控制電腦與發動機控制系統頻繁打架。當歐洲要求修改代碼時，商飛徹底傻眼——這些核心零部件的底層代碼和IP全在通用電氣和霍尼韋爾等西方巨頭手裡，直接被出口管制法鎖死。在國內，這架「政治大飛機」更成了燙手山芋。三大國有航司被強行攤派數百億超大訂單，高管們深知C919故障率居高不下，日利用率僅有3到4小時，唯恐摔機抹黑「大國崛起」而集體失眠，寧可讓它躺在機庫吃灰。高空系統癱瘓、客艙毫無預兆噴出大量白煙等驚魂內幕更遭到全網封鎖。北京以為捏住了歐洲巨頭的軟肋，但C919的心臟和核心器官都握在西方手中。一旦法美供應商聯手暫停供應發動機及配件，C919生產線將瞬間癱瘓，徹底淪為停機坪上的國際孤兒與廢鐵。
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軟肋遠不只芯片， C919客機暴露“厲害國”多項科技短板
華盛頓—就在華為面臨麒麟芯片斷供彈盡糧絕之際，中國“大飛機”C919所依賴的一連串美國尖端技術顯示出，中國的科技實力軟肋多多，還有多處技術“命門”掐在美國手中。
國產大飛機交付日期一再延後
中國政府最近關於科技產業的一系列動作和表態，似乎反映了中國愈加擔憂半導體芯片領域和商用飛機製造業受制於人的被動局面。
官方媒體報導說，8月31日，中國工業和信息化部部長肖亞慶在上任一個月後就到中國商用飛機公司（中國商飛）總裝製造中心浦東基地調研。他強調，要“牢記習近平總書記囑託”，把中國的“大飛機”事業“搞上去”。
肖亞慶具體指出，大飛機、航空發動機和集成電路產業對中國的戰略全局具有“重大意義”。
此前，習近平7月在一場企業家座談會上提出，要“集中力量辦好自己的事”，要“以國內大循環為主體”、“國內國際雙循環相互促進”。這一發展格局提議被分析人士解讀為中共中央高層的政策正在向關鍵核心技術領域傾斜，擺脫在關鍵科技領域被美國等西方國家“卡脖子”的窘境，甚至不惜重提在經濟和科技領域的自力更生。
中國商用客機發展步入“大飛機”時代，但進展並不順利。繼支線飛機“翔鳳”（ARJ21）在2016年投入運營後，中國商飛主攻研製的“大飛機”C919遇到不少難題。這款以空中客車A320neo和波音737MAX作為競爭對象的中短程窄體單通道客機自從2017年5月試飛後，交付日期從原定的2015年年底一拖再拖。
截至目前，中國商飛共生產了6架C919試飛飛機。中國東方航空已確定成為C919的首家用戶，官方宣布的交付日期定在2021年。
設在新加坡和馬來西亞的航空業分析機構Endau Analytics創辦人舒庫爾·尤索夫(Shukor Yusof)說，中國商飛C919明年交付的目標極具挑戰性。
“我從我在中國的聯繫人那裡了解到，飛機實際上已經差不多完工了。但與此同時，它還存在一些初期問題。”尤索夫對美國之音說：“至於C919（的交付） ，我認為現實地說，可能是2022年——如果他們能把交付日期提前到2021年底之前，那算是非常幸運的。別忘了，他們非常依賴西方的供應鏈，來自歐洲和美國的很多第三方供應商。而且隨著新冠疫情持續時間越來越長，我認為延遲是不可避免的。”
中國商飛一份日期標註為2020年7月的內部文件顯示，公司目標在2019年之後的“成熟期”每年生產150架C919客機，但沒有給出這一目標的具體日程。文件說，C919目前已經收到了28家客戶815架訂單。
航空與防務諮詢公司蒂爾集團（Teal Group）公佈的資料顯示，C919的開發成本估計達到了600億人民幣，但售價目前還不得而知。中國商飛的文件則顯示，C919的直接運營成本比同類機型降低了10%。
C919的“國產”只是名號？
中國商飛稱，其研製的支線客機ARJ21與中型客機C919都是自行研製、具有自主知識產權的產品。但是，中國商用客機的“國產”意義廣受質疑。
有關C919的國產率眾說紛紜。中國官方媒體宣稱，C919實現了近60%的國產化，並將力爭最終實現100%的國產化。但不可否認的是，目前參與C919製造的外國供應商扮演了極為關鍵、甚至是決定性的角色。
C919飛機在各項重要技術上對國外的依賴程度極高，飛機的動力系統、航電飛控系統、燃油系統、電源系統、起落架等關鍵領域，都直接採用國外成熟的產品和技術、或是由中外合資企業製造；中國國內航空工業部門參與設計製造的主要是機身、機翼、尾翼、內飾等部分。
華盛頓戰略與國際研究中心（CSIS）中國商務和經濟高級顧問兼理事會主席甘思德（Scott Kennedy）在接受美國之音採訪時斬釘截鐵地否定了中國大飛機全面國產化的前景。他說，C919的“中國身份”只是個名號。
甘思德說：“說到C919，它只是名義上的中國飛機。所有能讓這款飛機飛起來的東西都是西方的。它的供應鏈也不能稱作全球供應鏈，它實際上是一個西方的供應鏈，並且主要是美國的供應鏈。”
甘思德說，C919和已經在運行的支線飛機ARJ21一樣，都是基於外國產品原型而設計：“ARJ21的框架基本上就是麥道MD-80飛機，所有讓ARJ21飛起來的東西都是進口的。”
蒂爾集團副總裁、航空分析師理查德·阿布拉菲亞（Richard Aboulafia）的評價更為尖銳，他說，沒有美國技術，中國的大飛機工程將整個“脫軌”。
阿布拉菲亞對美國之音說：“沒有西方的發動機和航空電子系統，中國根本無法做成。真正的挑戰不是造飛機，真正的挑戰是發動機和航空電子設備，這是飛機的肌肉和大腦。建造一個機尾畫著國旗的鋁管並沒有什麼意義。”
美國企業捏著C919哪些命門？
美國通過“實體清單”對華為及其關係企業獲取芯片和其他技術的途徑進行封堵，台積電將從9月15日之後停止為華為生產高端的麒麟芯片。專家認為，比起華為和中興公司在芯片領域受制於美國的局面，中國航空製造業面臨的挑戰有過之而無不及。
戰略與國際問題研究中心的甘思德說：“人們在談論中國公司面臨的挑戰時，會說到華為等公司因為依賴重要的半導體而面臨的挑戰。而在航空領域，中國在飛機部件和組裝上（對西方）的依賴（比華為對西方的依賴）更強。”
C919使用的LEAP-1C發動機由美國通用電氣和法國賽峰公司合資的CFM國際公司研發生產。CFM在2015年7月向中國商飛交付了第一台LEAP-1C發動機。
美國時刻掌控C919的動力生命線並非杞人憂天。《華爾街日報》今年2月曾報導說，特朗普政府曾考慮停止向CFM國際公司發放向中國出口LEAP-1C發動機的許可證，也考慮限制通用電氣為C919提供航空電子系統的出口。
消息一出，中國航空工業發展研究中心高級工程師陸峰當時就發文指出：“此時停止供應發動機，無異於釜底抽薪”。儘管美國政府並未實施這一禁令，但經歷了一場虛驚的中國航空業時刻擔心，美國可以如法炮製，出於安全和戰略目的，禁止美國企業向中國提供航天發動機等關鍵技術，這一“達摩克利斯之劍”時刻懸在C919項目的頭上。
航空業分析機構Endau Analytics的尤索夫說：“無論是ARJ21還是C919，大部分用於製造飛機的部件都是西方國家製造的。在機身、零部件方面，比如輪胎、起落架、發動機，基本上都是從西方進口、在中國組裝的。它是空客320的複製品。”
除了發動機由CFM提供以外，C919的航電、飛控系統也極為依賴美國供應商（在中國政府的規定下，C919的許多外國供應商不得不在中國建廠或者通過合資企業組裝設備）。C919的一級供應商中，至少包括以下幾家美國企業（其中CFM為美法合資）：
- CFM國際公司（美國通用電氣與法國賽峰合作）提供LEAP-1C發動機；
- 設在俄亥俄州的通用電氣航空集團（GE Aviation）民用航電系統提供核心航電系統、顯示系統、機載維護系統和航電系統綜合服務；
- 總部設在俄亥俄州的運動和控制技術製造商派克漢尼汾公司（Parker Hannifin）旗下的派克宇航是C919飛機液壓系統、主飛控作動系統、 燃油系統和油箱惰化系統的供應商；
- 總部設在北卡羅萊納州的霍尼韋爾（Honeywell）為C919提供四項關鍵系統，包括飛行控制系統、機輪和剎車系統、輔助動力裝置及導航系統；
- 設在康涅狄克州的漢勝公司（Hamilton Sundstrand）承擔C919項目電源系統產品的研發和製造；
- 總部設在愛奧華州的羅克韋爾柯林斯（Rockwell Collins）與多家中國公司合資，為C919 項目研製生產綜合監視系統、通信與導航系統和全動模擬機；
- 紐約州的穆格公司（Moog）參與提供C919高升力系統。
甘思德說，中國近年來的戰略發展路線、以及美中關係緊張，讓美國製裁中國航空業的可能性驟然升高。他說：“中國最初在2008年、2009年對C919作展望，開始尋找潛在的供應商時，民用商業運用和國家安全之間的分界線相當明確。隨著美中關係的惡化，情況有所不同。隨著中國推行軍民融合計劃，民用與軍用的界限也發生了變化。現在很有可能的是，西方國家政府可能會重新審查美國和西方供應商承諾提供給C919的技術，可能認定這些技術會幫助中國軍事發展。”
他說：“C919的發動機就經歷了這樣的傳聞，至少在目前，他們躲過了這場困局。但隨著美中關係惡化和中國自身軍事發展的推進，這將始終是一個潛在的障礙。”
從“新四大發明”到“35項卡脖子技術”
從對高鐵建設、移動支付等“中國新四大發明”的盲目吹捧，到華為因美國斷供芯片被逼到彈盡糧絕時的赫然驚醒，官方控制下的輿論對中國科技實力的認知從三年前的不可一世轉變為如今的高度警覺。
2017年，一項針對在中國的外國留學生的調查將高鐵、網購、電子商務、共享單車列為最受留學生青睞的“中國技術”。儘管這四項技術並非來源自中國，許多中國媒體還是迅速將它們封為中國的“新四大發明”，並常常在對內宣傳時使用這樣的說法。
2018年6月，中國《科技日報》開闢“亟待攻克的核心技術”專欄，細數中國35項嚴重受制於外國的“卡脖子”技術，其中包括芯片領域的光刻機、射頻器件和超精密拋光工藝，飛機製造領域的航空發動機艙室、適航標準和航空鋼材，軟件領域的操作系統、工業設計軟件等。
就連中國引以為傲的人工智能技術，《科技日報》在分析中也承認，中國工業機器人技術的算法不精，穩定性和精確性遠遜於外國。
有關中國的科技軟肋，甘思德還補充道：“在製藥行業。中國人正在取得進步，他們在疫苗和基因治療的發展中貢獻巨大，但製藥業仍由美國和其他幾個國家主導。中國在製藥行業的發展還有很長的路要走。”
重提自力更生
在芯片設計製造和飛機發動機等“卡脖子”環節，中國政府正在試圖擺脫對西方的依賴。今年8月，中國國務院發布關於集成電路產業和軟件產業發展政策的通知，表示要從投融資、研發、進出口、人才、知識產權、市場應用、國際合作八個方面給予集成電路和軟件產業的政策支持。中國航發集團商發公司正在持續研製CJ-1000AX客機發動機，計劃2025年投入運營，希望讓這台國產飛機發動機代替中國C919客機目前使用的LEAP-1C發動機。
甘思德對於中國自力更生髮展商用飛機製造業的前景並不看好：“只有巴西、加拿大、美國、歐盟等少數幾個國家製造出了成功的商用飛機。俄羅斯也試過，但他們的飛機並不怎麼樣。印尼人、甚至日本人基本上都放棄了。所以這不是真要批評中國，因為我們討論的是最先進的技術。”
Endau Analytics諮詢機構創始人尤索夫認為，中國商飛想後來居上十分困難。他說：“雖然我不懷疑中國人最終可能會加入這一行列，但我想至少要10到20年的時間才能達到一定水平，或許還有競爭的能力。但我認為這將非常困難，因為波音和空客已經把商用飛機市場各控制了一半。因此，中國要想打破這種雙寡頭壟斷，他們很難說服世界各地的市場，讓航空公司購買飛機。他們（中國政府）可能會脅迫和影響中國的國有航空公司，讓東航、南航、國航購買這些飛機，因為它們都是被中國民航局控制的。”
蒂爾集團的阿布拉菲亞大膽預測，中國政府在航空等領域採取的自立門戶政策可能是為了美中全面脫鉤做準備。他警告，後果可能是讓中國重回冷戰時期的前蘇聯老路。
“他們並不准備在國際市場上競爭，他們只是在為了飛機自給自足的未來做準備，為西方和中國之間不再進行這種貿易做準備。”阿布拉菲亞說。
“這是對蘇聯模式的重複……世界上只有兩個國家曾經自己建造過雙通道噴氣式飛機。一個是美國，另一個是前蘇聯。”阿布拉菲亞說：“蘇聯飛機整體都不是很好。就像整個蘇聯經濟一樣，各方面都算夠用，但不是很好。不幸的是，中國政府正走這條老路。”
甘思德認為，試圖尋求自力更生和獨立的戰略只會減緩中國的技術進步：“如果這是他們最終要走的方向，他們會搬起石頭砸自己的腳。”
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-first-homegrown-commercial-plane-clear-skies-ahead/
China’s First Homegrown Commercial Jet: Clear Skies Ahead?
Apr 09, 2015
China
On December 30, 2014, Li Jia Xiang, chief of the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), flew on a regional jet liner from Shanghai Pudong to Beijing. But this journey was no ordinary flight.
After it safely landed in Beijing Airport, the jetliner, an ARJ21, had finally earned its Type Certificate from CAAC, which meant the aircraft model had satisfied its basic safety requirements and could enter China’s civil aviation market. It took the ARJ21 — the first commercially available aircraft ever designed in China — six long years to get this entry ticket.
Luo Ronghuai, deputy general manager of the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) and the chief of the ARJ21 Project, has been deeply involved in the whole process — from design and R&D through manufacturing to flight testing.
What challenges has ARJ21 gone through? Are these made-in-China aircraft safe enough? Who will purchase them? What is the status of China’s second foray into aircraft design, the larger C919? And what impact have these domestically designed and built aircraft on the upstream and downstream industry value chain? China Knowledge@Wharton talked with Luo Ronghuai recently about these questions and others.
Below is an edited version of the interview.
China Knowledge@Wharton: Let’s talk first about ARJ21 in detail. What does the plane look like, and what are the aircraft it will be competing with primarily in the global market?
Luo Rong Huai: The ARJ21 jet is a 70- to 90-seat, short-to-medium range, turbofan powered regional aircraft. It’s the first civil aircraft to which China owns independent intellectual property rights, and it’s also the first time the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration has agreed to accept and approve aircraft applications for flight certification based on the reviews of the Civil Aviation Administration of China.
Its major competition in the world will be [the Embraer] ERJ175 of Brazil and [the Sukhoi Superjet 100] SSJ from Russia, both regional aircraft with 70 to 110 seats.
“Since it was the first time China had designed an aircraft, we had no experience, so there were many experiments. We had to try again and again in order to get the results we wanted.”
China Knowledge@Wharton: The ARJ21 jet liner accomplished its first flight in November 2008. Why did take so long — six years — to obtain its certification?
Luo: Since it was the first time China had designed an aircraft, we had no experience, so there were many experiments. We had to try again and again in order to get the results we wanted. After the ARJ21’s first flight in 2008, we originally anticipated it would take at most four years to get the aircraft certified – but then the real challenges began emerging, many more of them than we had been able to imagine. Twitter
It took us a long time to study, explore and learn what we needed to know to meet all those certification requirements. For example, there’s an experiment called the “Natural Icing Flight Test” which originally was planned to take place in Xinjiang province [the region in the Northwest corner of China]. However, after flying the aircraft there repeatedly over a period of four years, we had still only completed part of that testing regimen. Finally, we had to look for suitable weather conditions in North America instead.
In order to finish all the flight tests of the ARJ21, for six years, we took the aircraft to the most extreme ends of China: The furthest north, the deepest south, the coldest, the hottest, the windiest and the most humid places in the country. And, we went to the U.S. and Canada to find extremely icy environments – the plan flew all around the Northern Hemisphere.
In addition to the enormous amount of time and resources we spent on overcoming technical barriers, we also gradually built up, for the first time, a team of testing and certification staff. But we’re still small. In Seattle, Boeing has a team of more than 250 people that work on flight test certification. Our Shanghai certification center has only 50 to 60 people, and the CAAC has another 30 to 40 people.
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China Knowledge@Wharton: What are these flight tests? Can you give some examples?
Luo: The major target of flight tests is to look at the most dangerous potential moments of the flight, and see how your aircraft performs — for example, a stall, passing through a 27-knot crosswind, or an engine failure, to name a few. Test pilots have to proactively seek out these low-probability events, which only happen once in tens of thousands of hours of flying time.
For example, there’s the “one engine inoperative” test, which refers, unsurprisingly, to a situation when one of the plane’s two engines isn’t working. So, you have to have test pilots shut down an engine in mid-flight to find out if the plane can be flown acceptably in that condition. But that’s only one of many, and these mandatory experiments take thousands of test flights. Only when you have tried to fly a plane under every dangerous condition you could anticipate, and proved that it can handle them, can the aircraft be considered safe to sell and fly commercially.
The type certification we took the ARJ21 through involved testing thousands of individual items. In the end, it added up to 3,418 reports and 300,000 pages, which, if you stacked them up, would be 30 meters high.
Although it was a long process, we have accumulated a lot of valuable experience for future aircraft tests. Having gone through this will make it easier and more efficient when we have to start putting our next aircraft, the large C919, through all these experiments in near future.
“The ARJ21 is the first regional aircraft China has produced based on international standards, and that it has been certified is a milestone for China’s aviation industry.”
China Knowledge@Wharton: What does this certification mean? What impact will it have for Chinese-made planes in future?
Luo: The ARJ21 is the first regional aircraft China has produced based on international standards, and that it has been certified is a milestone for China’s aviation industry. It demonstrates that we’ve successful developed our regional aircraft manufacturing technology.
The global aviation community recognizes the maturity of a country’s aviation industry by its ability to produce new aircraft that can be certified flightworthy. In the ARJ21-700 project, we have accomplished the entire process — from design to manufacturing, experimentation to flight tests. We mastered a bunch of new technology, new materials, new processes, and accumulated a lot of project-management experience, which has also laid the groundwork for future big aircraft projects like the C919.
China Knowledge@Wharton: Does this certification mean the plane can be delivered right away? Can the aircraft be exported to global markets like Europe and U.S. now?
Luo: Certification and delivery are two very different things. Every plane to be delivered to an airline has to obtain its own airworthiness certificate from the CAAC. At present, the CAAC is checking the first ARJ21-700 plane for this certificate. And the CAAC still has to audit and approve the quality-assurance system, the flight support system, and the continuous airworthiness program. Once all these checks have been done, the first ARJ21-700 plane will be delivered to Chengdu Airline [one of China’s domestic airlines] and formally start to fly, which we anticipate will happen this year.
For any airplane model to be exported to Europe and the U.S., it has to get the approval from local aviation authorities. For example, the FAA has to approve your plane if you want to sell it or fly it in the U.S. While we were working to get the ARJ21 its CAAC certification in China, the FAA conducted a shadow audit, which was mainly to examine the certification ability and methodology of the CAAC.
In that shadow audit, FAA selectively examined some items, like the natural icing flight test, the static original equipment manufacturer test, the maximum brake energy test, VMU test, etc., and sent staff to follow and examine the whole process of test basics, test guideline, methodologies, experiments, equipments and the result. After the ARJ21 got certification in China, the shadow certification also finished, and they will start another audit on recognition.
However, in some countries in Southeast Asia and Africa, certifications issued by CAAC are recognized locally, which means that Chinese-made and certified aircraft can fly in those countries.
China Knowledge@Wharton: After certification, what will you have to do next in terms of commercial efforts? And how long do you expect it will to recoup the high costs invested in this project?
Luo: Aircraft production is an industry with massive investment, high risks, and slow returns. It’s a long journey from experiments in labs to formally producing a plane, and after that to win a piece of the aircraft market. And it can take years beyond to achieve commercial success.
At present, we’ve received 308 orders for the ARJ21. After the delivery of the first one, COMAC hopes to quickly reach an annual output of 15 aircraft, and, longer term, to increase that to 50 planes a year.
For the ARJ21, we set three goals: The first one was technical success, which was met when we obtained type certification. The second one was market success: producing the aircraft with cost controls, commercial value and earning brand recognition in the market — and then winning a certain market share. The third one was commercial success: selling aircraft that are competitive in the marketplace, and that can bring economic benefits for airline companies. At this moment, we have a long way to go before we hit goals two and three.
China Knowledge@Wharton: You mentioned that it takes a great deal of money to build a new aircraft, and that the returns are slow. Given that, why should China still try to get into this industry? Also, what percentage of this project involves independently developed Chinese technology?
“Aircraft production is an industry with massive investment, high risks, and slow returns. It’s a long journey from experiments in labs to formally producing a plane, and after that to win a piece of the aircraft market.”
Luo: To make our own aircraft will activate many upstream and downstream industries in areas such as materials production and high-end equipment manufacturing. We can also gradually build up a base of local suppliers in related industries, which is suitable in the context of the current stage of China’s aviation market.
Regarding independent technology, for the ARJ21, our primary suppliers include four domestic ones and 19 global companies. We also have nearly 100 secondary suppliers in China. Global airplane manufacturers like Boeing don’t design engines, and they don’t make rivets either; they purchase parts from many suppliers instead. Boeing has nearly 10,000 suppliers globally for its parts. For our planes, COMAC is the general designer, and we integrate the best technology available globally into them.
However, or next plane, the large aircraft C919, which is still in development, will have a higher level of domestic involvement. There are 36 Chinese research institutions taking part in the project, as well as more than 200 Chinese companies, including 16 material suppliers and 54 potential parts suppliers. Meanwhile, 16 global suppliers, among them GE, Honeywell and CFM, have built joint ventures with domestic companies on avionics, flight controls and other airborne systems.
China Knowledge@Wharton: Can you talk a little more about the C919 and how it’s progressing?
Luo: The C919 is a 150-seat, single-channel, narrow-body aircraft, which will compete with the Boeing 737 and the Airbus 320. This is a class of aircraft that’s most in demand in China and the global civil aviation market.
So far, the C919 has finished the project demonstration phase, the demonstration of feasibilityand predevelopment, and it’s now moving into the engineering development stage. Assembly has begun on the first craft, and it’s expected that we will conduct its first flight by the end of 2015. Then, we will move into the flight-test certification process.
China’s major airlines, including China Eastern Airlines, China Southern Airlines, Hainan Airlines and some aircraft leasing companies have already ordered C919s. Huaxia Financing Leasing Co. has just signed a contract with us to purchase 20 C919s, which has boosted our client list up to 18 companies, and 450 total orders for the aircraft.
