During World War II, Juran served as an assistant administrator for the
Lend-Lease Administration. But following the War, he decided that big
bureaucracies weren't for him. Instead, he became a freelance management
consultant. He spent much of his time lecturing, researching, writing and
consulting about quality. He also made numerous trips to Japan to help
rebuild its shattered economy.
二次大戰時， Juran擔任「物資租借局」助理行政官；但戰後他認為龐大的官僚體系並不適合他。相反的，他成為了不受拘束的管理顧問。他花了大多數的時間在傳授、研究、撰寫與受諮詢跟品質有關的事務上。他也去日本，幫忙重建已頹廢的經濟。
In the years that followed, Juran wrote numerous books, including Juran's
Quality Handbook, commonly considered to be the international quality
reference book, now in its fifth edition. He also founded the Juran
Institute and the Juran Foundation (now the Juran Center at the University
of Minnesota) and was instrumental in starting the Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Award.
此後數年， Juran寫了許多書，包括這本一般被認為是國際性品質參考用書：「朱蘭品質手冊」（現已發行到第 15版了）。他也成立了「朱蘭研究所」和「朱蘭基金會」（現在明尼蘇達大學的朱蘭中心），並且在協助設立美國「鮑烈治國家優質獎」。
Although Juran retired from public life in 1993, he still occasionally
speaks, writes and is hard at work on his memoirs.Juran 在1993年退休，但他偶
而仍演講、寫作，以及撰寫他自己的「朱蘭回憶錄」。
In June, I interviewed Juran at his home in Rye, New York. Despite his 97
years, he's still physically strong and mentally sharp. Although sometimes
careful with his answers, he didn't fail to speak his mind. As with the
previous interviews I've conducted with him, Juran was polite, considerate
and humorous.
六月間，在 Juran位在紐約 Rye 的家中，我訪問了Juran。儘管已經 97歲高齡，他的身體仍舊硬朗，思考依然犀利。雖然有時回答地很小心，但他從未詞不達意。我與他接觸的幾次訪談中， Juran溫文有禮、體貼又詼諧。
QD: What do you think has been the greatest achievement in the quality world
during your lifetime?
QD （Quality Digest「品質文摘」之簡稱）：在您一生中，您認為在品質領域中最偉大的成就是什麼？
Juran: That's easy: the Japanese quality revolution. Remember, Japan set out
to get a place in the sun by military means. Obviously, that didn't work, so
they set out to do it by peaceful means, through trade.
朱蘭：很簡單。日本的品質革命。記住，日本以軍事手段開始建立太陽帝國，很明顯的沒有用；所以，他們開始用一種和平的工具，貿易。
As they undertook to do that, they found that trade requires you to import
materials, fashion them into goods and sell those goods. It's like the
British did a couple of centuries ago, becoming the most important power on
Earth. However, the Japanese had a big handicap: The stuff they had been
exporting prior to World War II was pretty shoddy. Although they had low
prices because their wages were very low, they had about the worst quality
reputation in the world.
當他們開始嘗試時，發現「貿易」需要進口原料、加工和出售成品；就像英國幾世紀前所做的一樣，這成為世界上做重要的一種力量。然而，日本卻有一個大問題：二次大戰前出口的物品相當差勁。因為工資低廉而使價格走低，但他們卻擁有全球品質最差的稱號。
When you can't sell your stuff and the reason is poor quality, that message
goes all the way to the top. They undertook to improve their quality and
improve their reputation. It took a long time, about 30 years or more, but
they were successful. Not only could they sell their stuff and get a large
market share; it brought them to the status of economic superpower.
高層完全同意下列訊息：「當你的品質差勁，你就無法賣出貨物。」因此他們著手改善品質與名聲。這花了 30年以上的時間，但它們非常成功。它們不只能夠賣出貨物、吃下更大的市場；也使得日本成為現在的經濟強權。
QD: How did the Japanese bring about this quality revolution?
QD ：日本是如何進行這場品質革命的？
Juran: They did a whole series of things. The top people took charge of
quality, which was pretty unusual. They undertook to train the entire
hierarchy in how to manage quality, which requires a lot of training. They
opened up the business plan to include goals for quality, which was
unprecedented. One of those goals was to get quality improvement every year,
year after year, at a revolutionary pace. The rest of the world was
improving quality at an evolutionary pace. These lines crossed, in my
estimate, somewhere around 1970.
朱蘭：他們進行了一連串的動作。高層負責處理品質異常的問題，嘗試以多種方式訓練組織層級內所有人「如何管理品質」；他們也史無前例地將「品質目標」放在營運計畫內。那些目標之一是，以革命的腳步，逐年改善品質。全球其他國家也正處於品質革命的階段上。我個人推算，這些線（品質革命之線）在 1970年代進行了交會。
They then went beyond the revolutionary approach to improvement. They did
something else that nobody in the West has managed to do: They made it
possible for the workforce to participate in improvement through something
called "QC Circles."
然後，他們在革命的路上進行改善。他們做了一些西方未曾做過的其他事情：他們藉著所謂「品管圈」，使得工作各單位參與改善品質成為可能。
QD: After decades of improvement, why is the quality of U.S. products and
services below that of the Japanese?
QD ：經過數十年的改善後，為何美國產品與服務品質會位居日本之下？
Juran: With relatively few exceptions, the United States is still below the
Japanese as far as quality is concerned. In fact, that's true for the West,
generally. Why? We have a lot of know-how about how to achieve high quality.
We even have a few role-model companies that did the same thing in pretty
much the same way. The approach is common for all the successful companies.
朱蘭：因為一些例外，美國目前在品質方面的水準仍舊低於日本。事實上，這現象對西方而言都一樣。為什麼？我們有許多追求高品質的技術。我們甚至有一些模範企業在相當多的方面，從事同樣的動作。這方法對所有成功的公司而言稀鬆平常。
We have a strange situation: We know how to do it, but our companies don't
do it. Here are some of my theories why they don't: A lot of companies have
tried to improve quality, and it didn't work. They listened to consultants
and spent a lot of time trying things out. Most of the time was spent
learning what not to do, what doesn't work. So a lot of companies gave up.
Bear in mind, mediocre quality is still saleable. People want the services
that new products bring. They buy them and take the chance that they are not
going to get a lemon.
但我們有個奇怪的情形：我們知道怎麼做，但我們不做。以下是我的理論：許多公司都嘗試改善品質，但毫無效果。他們聽從顧問，而且花下大量的時間去嘗試。但大多數的時間都在學習「什麼不要做」、「什麼不能做」。所以許多公司放棄了。記住，二流水準的品質仍舊可以賣出去。人們需要產品帶來的服務。消費者購買物品，也承擔了他們不要購買瑕疵品的風險。
A lot of companies think that their businesses are different. They are
different; they have different technology, different markets, different
culture and so on. But I found when I got into consulting many years ago
that every one of those different companies had common quality problems. To
diagnose those problems, I used certain diagnostic tools. To find remedies,
I used certain remedial tools. To hold the gains, I used certain common
control tools. I was going through the same sequence of events in company
after company, even though they were certainly different. So there is a body
of know-how there that is common and heading toward a science of managing
for quality.
許多公司都認為他們的行業別不同。他們很不同，他們有不同的技術，不同的市場、不同的文化等等。但是許多年前當我擔任顧問時，我發現不同的公司卻有相同的品質問題。為了診斷這些問題，我運用了一些診斷方法。為了找到補救方法，我採取了某些矯正手段。為了維持成績，我使用了某些常見的管制工具。在一家又一家的公司裡，我遇到一連串相同的事件，即使他們相當不同。所以會有一套技術：普遍而且能夠管理品質的科學。
A lot of companies believe that getting certified to ISO 9001 solves their
quality problems. That simply is not true. ISO 9001 has some value in trying
to minimize the number of assessments that are made. But the ISO 9000 series
was pitched at a mediocre level. The various ingredients that the Japanese
did differently are not a part of ISO 9000. We've been taken in by the
standardization people coming up with a standard that's not at the
excellence level but at the mediocre level. That's inherent in the way
standards are set. There has to be a consensus. The different members from
companies of different standardization bodies are not going to agree to
standards that their companies are not able to meet. They are starting to
change the standards, but that's at a glacial pace. It takes a long time to
change an international standard.
很多公司相信通過 ISO9001就能夠解決品質問題。這種簡單的想法不對。ISO9001 在縮小「評估項目」上有其價值。但ISO900 系列被放在二流水準之上。日本所採取的不同作法當中，其多樣化的組成並非ISO9000 的一部分。我們已經接受「標準化了的人」提出不是最佳的二流標準，那是依內在特質所設立之標準。一致性必須建立。不同公司內，不同標準單位中不同的人員，是不會同意有公司無法達到的標準存在。他們開始改變標準但寸步難行，改變國際性的標準曠日廢時。
Some people think that higher quality costs more. That confusion exists in
many different companies. The word "quality" has two very different
meanings: One meaning is the features of the product that enable it to sell.
There, higher quality generally costs more. It takes more product research,
more product development and so on. People don't even call it a cost; they
call it an investment, which will bring back higher returns. That's quality
on the marketing side or the income side.
有些人認為追求高品質會使成本增加，這種迷惑在許多不同的公司中都有。「品質」這個字有兩個非常不同的意義：一是能夠使物品賣出去的特徵 /特色；這方面的高品質就需要增加成本，這就需要更多的產品研發等等。人們不會稱它做成本，他們會稱其為：一種可帶來更高回報的「投資」。此即為市場面或獲利面的「品質」。
Quality on the cost side is quite different. The cost of failure, the
internal failures--scrap, rework, slow deliveries, failure to deliver on
time--and the external failures--field failures, lawsuits, safety problems.
成本面的品質則非常不同。失敗成本：內部失敗成本如報廢、重工、交期緩慢、不準時交貨，以及外部失敗成本如性能失效、訴訟、安全問題。
A lot of CEOs believe that they are too busy to lead the quality charge, and
so they delegate it. That hasn't worked very well. Leadership by the top
people is an essential ingredient in getting out of that steep slope.
多數首席執行官都相信他們過於忙碌而無法主導品質；所以他們授權，這並沒有太好的效果。高階領導是跳脫困難品質問題最必要的成因。
QD: You talked about ISO 9000. Are you surprised by its success and
widespread acceptance?
QD ：您談到ISO9000，你會為它的成功與被普遍接受而驚訝嗎？
Juran: I was astonished that it took off like it did. I am still surprised.
I must say that there are indications that the people who are paying for
those assessments are getting fed up. I remember in my astonishment I used
to ask companies: "What are you going into this for? What you're doing is
already much stricter than the criteria that are set out in ISO 9000." The
answer was: "We know that. But we don't think, from a marketing standpoint,
that we can be in a position where our competitor is certified and we are
not. We'd be at a marketing disadvantage."
對於它的發展我很震驚，我仍然很驚訝。我必須說，有些人因為這些評估項目的指示而得到茁壯。還記得在驚訝中，我會問公司：「你為何要從事 ISO？你現在所做的比 ISO9000所設定的還要嚴格許多。」答案是：「我們知道。但從市場角度而言，我們不認為我們能夠處在一個競爭對手獲得認證而我們沒有獲得認證的地位。」
There was a stampede that started out with Admiral D.G. Spickernell, the
head of the British Standards Institution. He persuaded the British military
to use the defense standard in assessing defense contractors. The standards
organization urged the standard on civilian buyers. It was all voluntary;
there was no compulsion to be certified. That began to take hold and be
strongly propagandized by the standards organization. And then, little by
little, whoever got themselves certified advertised the fact that they were
certified. The public didn't realize that they were being certified to a
mediocre standard. The idea that the standard was pitched at a mediocre
level has never been properly brought out.
英國標準局長 Admiral D.G. Spickernell開啟了一個大動作。他說服了英國軍方使用防衛標準來評估國防事業的訂約人。標準組織贊成對於民間購買者採用標準，而這全都是自願的，並沒有強制性認證。這也開始實施，同時標準組織也廣為宣傳。之後，漸漸地，得到認證的人就會去宣傳他們已經得到認證。公眾並不知道他們得到的只是二流的認證。被放在二流水平上，標準概念的想法從未能適當真實地呈現。
QD: Do you think that ISO 9000 has actually hindered the quality movement?
QD ：您認為ISO9000事實上阻礙了品質運動？
Juran: Of course it has. Instead of going after improvement at a
revolutionary rate, people were stampeded into going after ISO 9000, and
they locked themselves into a mediocre standard. A lot of damage was, and
is, being done.
朱蘭：當然。不在革命的路上追求改善，人們胡亂去追求 ISO9000；然後他們就陷入了二流標準之中。一大堆的損害以前造成了，現在持續出現。
朱蘭：當然。人們不以革命的速度來追求改善，而胡亂去追求 ISO9000，他們就陷入了二流標準之中。它一以前造成了大堆的損害，現在依然如此。
QD: What do you think of Six Sigma?
QD ：您對六標準差的看法如何？
Juran: From what I've seen of it, it's a basic version of quality
improvement. There is nothing new there. It includes what we used to call
facilitators. They've adopted more flamboyant terms, like belts with
different colors. I think that concept has merit to set apart, to create
specialists who can be very helpful. Again, that's not a new idea. The
American Society for Quality long ago established certificates, such as for
reliability engineers. Right now there are more than 100,000 certificates
issued by ASQ.
朱蘭：就我所見，這是品質改善的基本版本，它並無特殊之處。它包括了我們以前所謂的「引導者」。他們有一堆像以不同顏色的「帶」將人員分級等，許多虛華的、響亮的概念 /字彙。我認為這一分級的概念非常有用、有價值，可以獨立來分別找出不同本事的專家。再說一次，它並非新的想法。美國品執協會在很早以前就建立了認證機制，例如可靠度工程師。現在經美國品質協會認證過的人超 過10 萬人。
Most people don't even understand what Six Sigma means. It is a goal. A goal
of very few defects, down to defects per million. We used to think in terms
of percent defective. For example, 1 percent defective is 10,000 defects per
million units, a far cry from three or four. Basically, the concept is
perfectly good, but there is nothing new.
多數人甚至不知道六標準差所指為何。它係指一個目標。一個瑕疵非常少的目標，將低至百萬分之幾。我們習慣以「百分之幾的瑕疵」來思考。舉例而言，用「一百萬分之一」為單位來表示的話，百分之一的瑕疵係指每中有一萬的瑕疵；這對百萬分之三或四個缺點的要求而言，還差得遠。基本上，「六標準差」此概念相當不錯，但沒什麼新意。
It originally started with Bob Galvin, the former CEO of Motorola and a very
ardent pursuer of excellence in quality. Some years ago, he gave his
organization the job of improving quality and reducing the defect level by
an order of magnitude. Now, to reduce it from a few percent defective to
three per million, that's four orders of magnitude.
「六標準差」的始作俑者是由熱切渴望完美品質的前任摩托羅拉首席執行長 Bob Galvin帶頭的。若干年前，他給了他公司一項 "十倍速" 的品質改善工作，逐級減少瑕疵。如此說來，從某百分比的瑕疵降到每百萬分之三，這是" 十倍速"改善翻第四次（案：因此 Juran可能指 "十方次翻一次10/100/10000/1000000" ）。
The name Six Sigma comes from a measure of what we call process capability,
measuring the inherent uniformity of the process. One of the things that is
inherent in tools used to achieve improvement under the label of Six Sigma
is the concept of process capability. Now, to my knowledge, that concept of
process capability goes back to 1926, when I was a young engineer at Western
Electric. I got into a problem, and I ended up discovering that every
process can be quantified in terms of its inherent uniformity. That can be
compared with the tolerance limits to see whether the process is up to doing
the job. In addition, you can also see whether the process is capable but is
being misdirected. I am the inventor, if not the reinventor, of that
concept.
六標準差之名來自於對制程能力的測量，量測流程中固有的一致性。在追求改善的六標準差標示下，工具中有一個固有的概念，制程能力。此時，就我所知到的「制程能力」而言，它可以回溯到 1926年，當時我是西方電氣的一個年輕工程師。我遇到個問題，而我因為發現每一流程都可依其固有的一致性予以量化，進而解決了問題。這可以和允收程度相比，看流程是否正常運作。此外，你同時可以看到流程是否有力，但方向錯誤。
如果不是再創者，我是這個觀念的發明者。
QD: There is a lot of marketing hype around Six Sigma, just as there was
with ISO 9000. How do you feel about that?
QD ：有許多以六標準差之名進行的市場宣傳，就如ISO9000一樣。您對此感覺如何？
Juran: I am in favor of improving quality by whatever means. Right now, I
think that what has really caused the spread of Six Sigma is GE. They went
into quality improvement, urged, I think, by what Bob Galvin had done at
Motorola. Jack Welch personally went into this. Then he went public with the
results to huge acclaim and huge savings running into the billions of
dollars. That got a lot of press and was pretty hard to ignore.
朱蘭：我贊成用各種方法來改善品質。眼下，我認為真正將六標準差發揚光大的是奇異電氣（ GE）。他們從事品質改善、鼓勵之。我認為， Jack Welch所做的和Bob Galvin 在摩托羅拉所做的一樣。然後，他將該公司對六標準差的熱烈的歡呼與其節省數十億美元的成果公諸於世。這就吸引了諸多媒體的青睞，而且很難不注意他。
I don't like the hype, and I don't think the hype is going to last.
Something that is as successful as the improvement process gets label after
label after label. Those labels come and go, but the basic concept stays.
There will be some marketer that finds a new label, finds a way to make that
a fad and off he'll go, doing the same thing we did before under a new
label.
我不喜歡這種噱頭，而且我也不認為這種噱頭可以持續下去。有時得到一次又一次的標誌後，它真的如流程改善一般成功。標籤來來去去，但基本概念卻原地不動。總會有人在市場中找到新標籤，而且找個蔚為風尚的方法；在新標籤下作我們過去所做的事情。
QD: You were very involved with he development of statistical methodology in
quality. Can you tell us about the development of statistics in quality?
QD ：您在利用統計方法改善品質方面投入大量精力。您能談談統計技術在品質中的發展嗎？
Juran: The use of statistical methods in quality dates back to 1903, when
the Bell System faced a problem designing its central offices. A subscriber
takes the phone off the hook and gets a dial tone. That means he's connected
to a line that goes to the central office. The question was, "How many of
those lines do you need?" Theoretically, every single subscriber could take
his or her instrument and start to use it, so you'd need a line for every
subscriber. Actually, subscribers don't do any such thing. Only a few
percent at one time are using it. So you need on average only a few percent
as many lines as you have subscribers. Now, the question was, "Are we
willing to operate at the average?" No, there'd be too many cases of a
subscriber not getting a dial tone. So how many lines should you provide?
That took statistical analysis. They took data: What's the rate of busyness
day by day, hour by hour? Based on that, they identified when the traffic
was busiest, how many lines that required, and that enabled them to make a
managerial judgment as to how many trunk lines to provide. That was the
earliest application of statistics in the Bell System.
朱蘭：統計方法在品質中的應用，可以回溯於比爾電氣 1903年所遇到，一個關於設計交換中心的問題。一位用戶把電話從線圈中移開，而且聽到嘟嘟的撥號音。亦即，他已經與交換中心有所連接。問題是，你需要多少線路？理論上，每個單一用戶可以取得設備而且開始使用它。所以每個客戶都需要一條線。事實上，客戶不會做這種事。只有很少數的用戶偶然會使用到，經過平均後，你只需要為一定比例的客戶準備多條線路。問題是，我們願意在平均數上面花精神嗎？不，沒有收到撥號聲的客戶也有很多。所以，到底你要提供多少條線路？這就需要統計分析了。他們抓取數據：每日、每小時的線路繁忙時段的比例為何？基於上述，他們確定了最繁忙的時段，需要多少線路；同時也使他們能做出符合管理原則的判斷：需要提出多少幹線？這是比爾公司內最早應用統計的情況。
Bell Labs thought that these tools might have application in the factory. In
1926 a delegation from the Bell Labs came to Western Electric's Hawthorne
factory, where I was employed as a young engineer. They met with the chief
inspector and some of his people. They formed a joint committee on
inspection, statistics and economy, and they agreed to meet a couple of
times per year.
貝爾實驗室認為這些工具可以應用在工廠中。 1926年從比爾實驗室調來一個代表團到西方電氣的Hawthorne 工廠，當時我在那兒擔任一名年輕的工程師。他們與首席檢驗員見面和他的成員。他們為檢驗、統計與規模成立了一個委員會，他們同意每年會面兩次。
The head guys in Western Electric soon discovered that nobody in the place
knew anything about statistics, so they brought in a professor from the
University of Chicago to give a course. About 20 managers and engineers
attended that course, and I was one of those engineers. Then to help the
committee in dealing with the statistics, they set up a little department
with a boss and two engineers called the inspection statistical department.
I was one of those engineers. As the committee met and got into scientific
sampling, they soon discovered the control chart, which was an invention of
one of the Bell Labs' mathematicians, Walter Shewhart. Although he was a
brilliant mathematician, he had a limitation: His knowledge of the factory
was nil. He was a very poor communicator as far as lay people were
concerned. He needed an interpreter, so I was asked to pilot him around the
factory.
西方電氣的大頭們很快發現，沒有人瞭解統計。所以他們請了一位芝加哥大學的教授來授課，包括我在內有約莫 20名工程師參加，然後協助委員會處理統計問題。他們設置了一個主管兩個工程師的小部門，稱為「檢驗統計部」，而我是其中之一。當委員會碰面進行科學抽樣，他們不久就發現了由貝爾實驗室的一位數學家 Walter Shewhart所發明的「管制圖」。雖然他是一位極優異的數學家，但有侷限；他完全沒有工廠方面的知識。他是個非常差勁的溝通者，常把需要關注的人拋諸腦後。因為他需要一個翻譯，所以我便被要求領著他看工廠。
I had the job of selling some of this stuff to the inspection supervisors,
but I very seldom made a sale. They had empirical ways and they stuck to
them. So there was almost a state of dormancy there until World War II. At
that time, the War Production Board, whose job was to harness the civilian
economy to the military machine, set up a department to help improve quality
in the military. As luck would have it, they appointed two professors to
head that department. They concluded that in order to improve quality, we
should teach the factories statistics.
我有賣出一些東西給檢核幹部的責任，但我賣的很少。他們有來自於經驗的方法，並且奉行不渝。所以到二次大戰時，生意上呈現了無生氣的狀態。當時，負責為結合民間經濟與軍事機器，所設立的「戰時生產委員會」中，成立了一個幫助改善軍品品質的部門。幸運之神眷戀，他們指定了兩位教授領導該部門。他們的結論是，為了改善品質，我們應該把統計學交給工廠。
Eugene Grant of Stanford University went around the country giving these
courses for free. A lot of companies sent their young engineers. Now, these
courses didn't affect who won the War, but they had a tremendous effect on
the people who attended those courses. They were meeting people from other
companies for the first time in their lives. It was wonderful to be able to
exchange information. They formed a bunch of quality societies in different
cities around the country. Those finally became the ASQ. They created a
journal that at the outset contained nothing but statistics. It took a long
time for the idea that managing for quality is the important thing, and
statistics is a part of that. They resisted that. To them, statistics was
everything.
Ed Deming went to his grave believing statistics is everything. If you make
use of statistics, everything gets resolved. Of course, he never managed
anything. He didn't know about managing.
史丹佛大學的 Eugene Grant免費全國巡迴授課，許多公司都派遣了年輕工程師參與。現在，這些課程並未對戰勝者有何影響，但對參加課程的人產生了巨大的影響。他們第一次與其他公司的成員一起開會：能夠互換訊息是件美好的事情。他們在美國各地成立了
一個個社團，這些最終成為了「美國品質協會」。協會初期出版的刊物除了統計什麼都沒有。「管理品質是件很重要的事情，而統計只是其中一部分」，這個概念的成立花了一段很長的時間。他們抗拒它。對他們而言，統計是全部。直到戴明過世前，他都相信「統計是全部」；如果你使用統計，每件事情都搞定了。當然，他從未管理過任何事情，他不瞭解管理。
QD: Obviously, you've achieved tremendous success in your lifetime. To what
do you attribute that success and your drive for achievement?
QD ：很明顯，在您的生命中，您已獲得了巨大的成就。是什麼造成您的成就？而它是受到什麼樣的驅使？
Juran: I'm surprised that it happened. I've kept a pretty low profile. I
keep the publicity people at the Juran Institute on a pretty short leash. I
don't like flamboyant statements about myself. I started out like any other
recruit in a big company. I was recruited out of engineering school, I did
some useful things for my bosses and I got promoted. That was a mistake.
They took a pretty good analyst and made a lousy manager out of him. At the
end, I found that my weaknesses in human relations had caught up with me,
and I was finished. I knew I wasn't going to go any higher in the
organization.
朱蘭：我很驚訝這竟然發生了。我一直保持著低調。我在朱蘭研究所和公眾有相當短的聯繫。我不喜歡大肆張揚我自己。我像其他公司的任何新進員工一樣起步。從工程學校畢業後被雇用，我做了一些對老闆有利的工作並獲得提升。那是一個錯誤：他們有一個非常好的分析師，卻創造出一個差勁的經理。最後，我發現我的缺點一直跟著我，然後我玩完了。我知道在組織裡面我不能得得到更高的職位。
When World War II came along, I was appointed the assistant lend lease
administrator for the Foreign Economic Administration.
當二次大戰開始，我被指派為國外經濟管理局的助理借貸行政官。
At the end of the War, I had to figure out what I was going to do. I
realized I had gotten to be kind of a misfit in these big bureaucracies, and
I opted to become a freelance consultant. I wanted to be more than a
consultant: research, consult, philosophize, write, lecture, the works. Of
course, there wasn't any ready-made job like that. I had to piece one
together, and it worked out wonderfully.
戰爭結束時，我必須為未來將做些什麼有所打算。我知道我並不合適待在這些大官僚體系中，我選擇擔任一個不受限制的顧問。我要作得比顧問更多：研究、諮詢、進行哲學性論述、寫作教書等工作。當然，這類工作並未有任何的準備。我必須將其拼湊起來，而讓它能完美的運作。
I also had an urge to write. It was an itch I had for a long time. So I
wrote a great deal. Every month I wrote articles for the journals of the
ASQ, the American Management Association and others. Those were read by a
lot of people. Also, while I contemplated making that change, I had in mind
preparing a comprehensive work on the subject, which came to be known as the
Quality Control Handbook, which is now in its fifth edition. That brought me
to the attention of a lot of people in the field. So one thing seemed to
follow another. In fact, at the time I became a freelance individual, I
didn't want any kind of organization. I didn't want to be a boss, and I
didn't want to be a subordinate. Things seemed to grow naturally. All of
those medals and honors were just byproducts of that.
我也有寫作的動力。因為長久以來我一直手癢，所以我大量寫作。我每個月都為「美國品質協會」、「美國管理學會」等單位寫文，有很多人會讀他們。同時，當我自忖想做些改變，同時也在構思準備一個全面性工作，亦即周知的「品質管制手冊」，到今天已經是第 15版了，到今天已經是第 15版了。，當時我是個自由人；我不需要任何組織。我也不當老闆、不要伙計。一切事情都那麼自然，所有的勳章與榮耀都指示副產品罷了。
QD: Which of your achievements are you the most proud of?
QD ：這些成就中，您最感到驕傲的是什麼？
Juran: I'd be pretty hard put to answer that. I am not even sure that I am
proud. I am an immigrant, and I came from a pretty impoverished family. I
lived in a neighborhood where everyone else was poor. Your outlook is very
different when you start out that way. My goal in going into higher
education was just getting away from all of that. I discovered in all the
different jobs I held in those days that the employers favored someone who
was going for an education. It seemed to be the passkey to getting out of
poverty. You learn some pretty useful habits if you have to live in those
circumstances. You're not afraid of long hours or hard work.
朱蘭：這問題不好回答。我甚至不確定我有所自豪。是個移民，來自於一個貧困的家庭。我的周遭鄰居都很窮。在這種環境下成長，你的看事情的觀點會很不一樣。我的目標是：受到更高等教育，所以我要跳脫這一切。我發覺過往我所從事的任何行業，雇主都想要聘用具教育水準的人；這看來是脫離貧困的一把鑰匙。如果在這種環境下生活，你會養成很多有用的習慣。你不會害怕度日如年或者辛苦工作。
QD: What advice would you give to someone just starting out in quality
today?
QD: 對於今日有志於從事品質工作者，您有什麼忠告？
Juran: I would start out by saying, "Are you lucky!" Because I think the
best is yet to be. In this current century, we are going to see a lot of
growth in quality because the scope has expanded so much. We used to think
that it was a factory problem. No more. It has expanded from the factory to
the offices to the warehouses and away from manufacturing to all the other
industries, including the giants: health care, education and government.
朱蘭：我想先說：「你們很幸運！」我認為最好的還沒到。在本世紀，我們將因為品質範疇的擴展而看到它成長茁壯。以前我們習慣於「品質」是工廠的問題。這還不夠！它已經從工廠到辦公室，再到倉庫、已離開生產而擴張到所有其他行業。
About the Author
關於作者 Scott M. Paton is Quality Digest's editor in chief. Letters to the editor
regarding this piece can be e-mailed to letters@qualitydigest.com
史考特 M派頓是品質文摘的主編。任何想與作者聯絡的信件請電郵至
letters@qualitydigest.com
